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ABSTRACT
A MODEL FOR THE ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN AID
by
ERNESTO A. MIRANDA R.
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1979
The purpose of this Dissertation is to devise a 
model of the desirable pattern of allocation of foreign aid.
It attempts to allocate aid in a consistent way with the 
maximization of the goals foreign aid is intended to ac­
complish (a matter involving social preferences and equity 
considerations) under the constraint represented by the 
available pool of aid.
A theoretical model of allocation is developed. A 
world social welfare function is postulated, which permits 
to contemplate both growth and income distribution effects 
of aid between countries. The level of income of each country 
is taken to represent its welfare level, and income level is 
defined in terms of a production function where aid is 
treated as another productive factor. This allows to make 
world social welfare a function of both aid levels and its 
distribution, and therefore, the analysis of the effects of 
marginal changes in the level of aid.
The maximization of the world social welfare func­
tion subject to available aid yielded an allocation index 
according to which proposed aid would be distributed. The
viii
allocation index is a composite of two multipliers: first,
a multiplier for population shares, and second, a performance 
multiplier which adjusts upward or downward the population 
shares multiplier.
An empirical application of this model is performed 
for a sample of 60 LDCs for different categories of aid, for 
the average of the period 1965-1973. Both a supply and a 
demand approach to the estimation of the productivity of 
aid - which is approximated by the productivity of foreign 
capital inflows - is attempted. Based on relative explana­
tory power, the supply approach is rejected, and the com­
putations which follow are based on the demand approach 
exclusively.
When the allocation index based on these estimates 
is applied next to different categories of aid for different 
periods, large discrepancies between actual and proposed aid 
are apparent. These discrepancies are different for Multi­
lateral and Bilateral Aid, Nominal and Grant Equivalent, 
Commitments and Net Official Flows, and for different periods. 
Some of these results accord to and others differ from my 
expectations. Nevertheless, the one result that is clearly 
apparent and indisputable is that the potential advantages 




I. Since the end of World War II there has been an 
increasing concern by DCs (developed countries) over the 
problems of economic backwardness and economic development. 
Though originally related to the reconstruction of the 
countries devasted by the War, through time, and pari passu 
with the recovery of those countries, emphasis shifted toward 
LDCs (less-developed countries).
This concern has been reflected in different forms 
of assistance that advanced countries provide to LDCs: tech­
nical assistance and resource flows, either private or 
official.
No agreement exists as to the ulterior motives of 
DCs in this endeavor. The "United Nations doctrine"^- pro­
poses humanitarian considerations as the primary motivation: 
foreign assistance is a moral responsibility on the part of 
advanced countries and an essential element in progress 
toward international peace and solidarity. Another type of 
motivation is that associated with European countries' assis­
tance to former colonies. In this case, foreign assistance 
is regarded as an essential element in the process of easing 
the transition to independence and formation of new schemes 
of cooperation, while maintaining close economic and cultural 
ties. Yet another is the inducement and promotion of viable,
1
2politically stable self-sustaining economic units in LDCs, 
which would eventually participate on an equal standing in 
international trade and the world economy. This latter can 
also be understood in terms of attempts to spread the market 
economic system which characterizes western countries to all 
countries of the world.2
Overall, it can be said that DCs' concern for growth 
and its assistance to LDCs is based on humanitarian, national 
economic benefit and long-range national security considera­
tions. However, the emphasis put on each of these factors 
varies from country to country according to their particular 
political, cultural and economic peculiarities.
II. The Problem of Aid Allocation
Foreign assistance will vary in composition following 
more or less closely the specific mix of motives in forming 
the decisions of donor countries and the requirements of 
recipients. Foreign assistance may take the form of military 
assistance, export credits and trade preferences, food 
grants, and assistance for expansion of the productive 
capacity. Of these, I shall be concerned solely with that 
part which is granted by official agencies primarily for 
promoting economic development. This concept corresponds 
to that of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as defined 
by the 0. E . C . D . 3
These transfers of resources can be identified as aid 
by their concessional character, reflected in their terms
3(the cost of aid for the recipient country, composed of the 
rate of interest to be paid and the duration of the loan) 
being "softer" than those prevailing in world capital markets. 
Not all types of aid, though, are granted at the same terms: 
it varies according to the purposes it is intended to serve. 
And, in general, bilaterial aid, that which is granted di­
rectly by official agencies, is softer than aid channelled 
through multilateral agencies. The overall terms of aid to 
a particular country result, then, from the mix of different 
categories of aid it has received, being that mix - so is 
argued by foreign aid practioners - contemplated in the 
process of aid allocation. The normalization of different 
types of aid results in what is known as "grant equivalent 
aid," a concept which is further discussed in the text.
Being foreign aid limited in supply, the purposes 
it is intended to serve and the terms under which it is 
granted makes it a very scarce commodity. If the market 
were used as the mechanism for its distribution, it would, 
under the conditions stated above, bid up the cost of aid 
(i.e., make the terms "harder"), thus destroying its con­
cessional nature. Alternative mechanisms for distribution 
must instead be employed.
The problem of aid allocation can be stated, then, 
as that of devising an operational methodology through which 
a scarce commodity, foreign aid, is distributed amongst LDCs 
in such a way that their economic development and welfare be 
maximized. Such a system should guarantee that aid be used
4productively, that is to say, that it contributes to economic 
development and to welfare increases. Further, given our 
interest in intercountry aid allocation, it should guarantee 
that aid levels to each country be consistent to the contribu­
tion that aid makes to the economic development and welfare 
of that country relative to the contribution to the economic 
development and welfare of the rest of the countries. Finally, 
it should also guarantee that all available aid is allocated. 
Essentially, then, the problem consists of allocating a given 
pool of aid in a way that its contribution to the economic 
development and welfare of each country be equal at the 
margin.
Ill. Purpose of this Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to devise a 
model of the desirable pattern of allocation of foreign aid. 
This model is normative in the sense that it is aimed at the 
determination of an "ideal" aid allocation profile. That is 
to say, attempts to allocate aid in a consistent way with the 
maximization of the goals foreign aid is intended to accom­
plish (a matter involving social preferences and equity con­
siderations) under the constraint represented by the avail­
able pool of aid. Essentially, then, it is an optimizing 
model, based on principles and techniques stemming from 
economic theory, intended to ensure the maximum fulfillment 
of the goals for a given pool of aid.
5IV. Outline of Chapters
Chapter Two of this dissertation is a review of the 
literature. The first section is an introduction. The sec­
ond section deals with the general approaches that have been 
proposed in the past to attack the problem of aid allocation: 
the Two-Gap Model of Chenery and Strout (1965, 1966) and 
McKinnon (1964), which is aimed at estimating LDCs' foreign 
aid requirements of aid to attain a given target growth rate 
in GNP and eventually achieve a "self-sustained growth"; 
Adelman and Morris (1968) set themselves to estimate the 
"economic development potential," or prospects for growth of 
LDCs, so that aid be allocated accordingly; Ahluwalia and 
Chenery (1974) address the income distribution implications 
of growth in LDCs, and propose a methodology for weighting 
the contribution of aid to economic development by its con­
tribution to welfare of poorer segments of the population and 
poorer countries. A restricted version of this latter ap­
proach constitutes the core of the model I develop here.
The third section deals with past attempts to find 
the rationale of actual aid allocation which are reviewed 
as a background to the discussion in the fourth section of 
the normative models that in response to those findings have 
been proposed: Cline and Sar.gen (1975) , which presents a
methodology for estimating a "recommended aid profile" based 
on growth performance (a composite of a series of economic 
variables that are known to influence the process of economic 
growth), and poverty, as measured by per capita income (to
6include "need" considerations and welfare impact). And 
Edelman and Chenery (1977), which on the basis of the me­
thodology developed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974), address 
themselves to the discussion of the benefits in LDCs' over­
all increments in welfare-derived-from-aid of redistributing 
aid so that poorer countries receive a larger share of the 
pool of foreign aid.
Chapter Two concludes with a discussion of the 
general methodological features of past aid allocation models 
and their major shortcomings. A brief description of the way 
the theoretical model that is presented in Chapter Three in­
tends to solve those deficiencies serves both as a justifica­
tion for this work and an introduction to that chapter.
Chapter Three presents the theoretical model which 
constitutes the core of this dissertation. A multiplicative 
world social welfare function a la Ahluwalia an d Chenery, 
but restricted to the inter-country welfare implications of 
aid allocation, is postulated. Maximizing this function 
subject to the constraint of the available pool of aid 
yields an "allocation index" such that aid should be dis­
tributed in direct proportion to the ratio of the contribu­
tion of aid to growth to per capita income, relative to the 
average of that ratio for all countries, and guarantees the 
pool of aid is exhausted. These results are consistent with 
the a priori requirements an allocation system should fulfill. 
A numerical example is presented to illustrate the workings 
of the model.
7Chapter Four is an empirical application of the 
model to a sample of 60 countries for the period 1965-1973. 
Although the sample was not selected at random, the generality 
of the results can be defended either on the grounds that 
the countries were selected at random from those with avail­
able data or from the fact that the aid actually allocated 
to them constitutes approximately 75 percent of all aid for 
the period. Both a supply and a demand approach were at­
tempted in order to estimate the contribution of aid to 
growth. But based on explanatory power, the supply approach 
was rejected, so that most of the attention is dedicated to 
the development and testing of the demand approach.
Estimates of foreign capital inflow contribution to 
growth, that is assumed to represent better the overall 
contribution of aid to growth, are then used to compute the 
proposed allocation profile for different categories of aid.
The standard deviation of the differences between proposed 
and actual aid allocation profiles is used to make an overall 
assessment of discrepancies.
The results attained are consistent with expectations. 
They show that for all categories of aid the discrepancy 
between actual and proposed aid profiles is large. Those for 
bilateral aid are larger than the corresponding to multi­
lateral aid, and when those categories are normalized in terms 
of their grant component, smaller discrepancies are apparent. 
Overall, a strong case can be made against actual aid alloca­
tion for the period under consideration, what implies that
8actual allocation is very far apart from that which would 
have maximized the welfare impact of aid on LDCs taken 
as a whole.
Chapter Five presents the conclusions and limita­
tions of this dissertation. Further research and various 
extensions are proposed to make this model and its empirical 
applications more realistic and operational.
9FOOTNOTES FROM CHAPTER ONE
1-As suggested by G. Ohlin (1966) .
^For a thorough review of the objectives of foreign 
aid, see R. F. Mikesell (1968), Ch. 1. For a review of 
allocation policies of individual donor countries, see 0.
E. C. D. Review 1969, pp. 160-165.
3See 0. E. C. D. Review 1969, pp. 239-245. The Flow 
of Dinancial Resources to LDCs as recorded by 0. E. C. D. 
already excludes military assistance and private grants to 
individuals. ODA is a part of the former, defined in the 
following terms:
" . . .  all flows to less developed countries 
and multilateral institutions provided by 
official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive 
agencies, which meet the following tests:
a) They are administered with the 
promotion of the economic develop­
ment and welfare of developing 
countries as their main objective; 
and
b) Their financial terms are intended 
to be concessional in character."
pp. 241-242.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
I. Introduction
The subject of Growth is not new in Economics. In 
fact, it is as old as the discipline itself: major concern
of Classical Economists was the creation of wealth, its dis­
tribution, and growth. Thus, A. Smith (1776) viewed the 
extent of the division of labor as the basis for improvements 
in the productive capacity of the economy. D. Ricardo (1817) 
ventured on the realm of determining the growth path of the 
economy, which he found to lead to a stationary state. ^
K. Marx's concern was broader than the economic sphere, 
but ". . . to lay bare the economic law of motion of modem
O
society . . . The evolution of the economic structure
was crucial in the process of social change, and in capi­
talist societies, capital accumulation was the primary force 
leading to the advent of socialism.
Neoclassical Economists took growth for granted, 
concentrating in the fields of price determination and re­
source allocation. Despite the chronic repetition of periods 
of rapid growth followed by recession, it was not until the 
Keynesian Revolution, b o m  in the embrace of the biggest of 
all recessions, that the analytical framework was laid for 
the study of business cycles. The dynamization of Keynesian 
Economics, in the hands of Harrod (1939, 1948) and Domar (1946),
10
11
was to become the point of departure of most modern
O
theories of economic growth. "Ironically enough, while 
the original Harrod-Domar model emphasized the demand as­
pect, in actual practice development economists used the 
model in a supply approach."^ This resulted in the develop­
ment of production functions and improvements in its speci­
fication through time.
Modem theories of economic' growth, though, have been 
only marginally interested in problems of economic backward­
ness. Instead, they have concentrated upon the variables 
relevant for achieving a steady growth in output, in mature, 
capitalist economies:
"By and large, the growth models we have 
been discussing were initially formulated 
with a view to explaining the growth 
process in developed countries where 
long-run growth is assured . . . While 
changes in the social structure continue 
to take place, the fundamental condi­
tions for steady growth . . . exist in 
one degree or another in Western non- 
Communist countries."^
Notwithstanding, the preoccupation for the transition 
from one stage of development to another has also been a 
field of interest through time. We find it already in the 
works of Sismondi (1836), Condorcet (1795), different 
members of the German Historical School (Roscher, Schmoller) 
between many others, and indeed K. Marx. The best known pro­
ponent of this approach today is W. W. Rostow (1956, 1961), 
whose "stage theory" has had an enormous influence on modern 
development theory and public policy especially as related 
to foreign aid.
12
Rostow visualizes five stages in the transition to 
self-sustained growth: one, the traditional society, charac­
terized by backwardness and slow or no growth; two, the long 
period during which the economic and social preconditions 
for growth are accomplished; three, the period of "take-off," 
characterized by a sharp increase in the rate of productive 
investment, the development of one or more dynamic manufac­
turing sectors, and the development of an institutional frame­
work conducive to the diffusion of growth throughout the 
economy; four, the rapid drive to maturity; and five, achieve­
ment of self-sustained growth. On presenting below the 
foreign aid theories, Rostow1s influence will be apparent.
To end this general overview, it is worth mentioning 
some of the other specialized theories dealing with develop­
ment and backwardness. In different ways, these also lie in 
the background of the general approaches to aid distribution 
that will be reviewed in Section II.
Nelson (1956) and Leibenstein (1957) are the authors 
of the Critical Rate of Growth, or Minimum Effort Thesis: 
in order to escape the "low level equilibrium trap," a 
"critical minimum effort" to raise per capita income above 
that level at which growth-inducing forces become dominant, 
is necessary. Balanced Growth and Big Push Theories, defended 
by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1961) and R. Nurkse (1957), con­
tend that the process of growth involves the existence of 
inducements to invest, which do not depend solely on the 
complementarity of industry from the supply side, but also
13
from the demand side, since investment in one industry depends 
upon the generation of demand by investment in other indus­
tries. Investment should proceed, then, nearly simultaneously 
in all fronts. Given the imperfect knowledge about the future 
level of demand. Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) suggests the answer 
would lie in programming.
W. A. Lewis (1954) is the best known proponent of the 
"surplus labor" approach according to which the primary role 
that capital plays in growth is to expand industry in order 
to absorb surplus or "disguised" unemployed labor in the 
rural or subsistence economy. Building on Lewis, Fei and 
Ranis (1964, 1966) formulated a more detailed model of the 
process of development in the labor surplus economy, which 
they named "dual economy." The contribution of the agri­
cultural sector to development consists, according to their 
thesis, of surplus labor, and takes the form of manpower for 
the expansion of manufacturing, and savings in the hands of 
landlords: part of it increases agricultural productivity,
another is channelled to finance the expansion of industry.
Finally, the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin 
America can be singled out as the locus for the theories of 
different authors, like R. Prebisch (1959, 1963), G. Myrdal 
(1956) and H. Singer (1950), who view international trade 
and foreign capital as the principal factors in promoting 
growth in LDCs. Their approach is based on the recognition 
of the historical pattern of LDCs' integration to the World 
Economy (as exporters of primary products and importers of
14
manufactured goods), which they reject as a long-run viable 
alternative. Import substitution, industrialization and 
export diversification are proposed as the strategies for 
economic development, where foreign capital and export 
markets are crucial to finance the process of transformation 
and secure its persistence.
II. General Approaches to Foreign Aid Allocation
Three general approaches to aid allocation have been 
proposed in the literature. I refer to them as "general" 
because of their methodological features and to differen­
tiate them from the "normative" models discussed in Section
IV.
1. The Two-Gap Model
Chenery and Strout (1965, 1966) and McKinnon 
(1964) are credited for the development of this approach. 
Essentially, it consists of the determination of foreign aid 
requirements for achieving self-sustained growth in LDCs.
On the basis of a theoretical model of the development 
process, its statistical estimation for different sets of 
parameters permits the determination of the time path and 
levels of foreign aid required for the achievement of self­
sustained growth. These estimates can be used to assess the 
performance of LDCs in terms of growth and the cost in terms 
of foreign aid requirements, which in turn can be used as a 
guide for the allocation of foreign aid.
Their argument is developed as follows:
15
"Modern theories of economic development 
investigate the process by which a poor, 
stagnant economy can be transformed into 
one whose normal condition is sustained 
growth. There is a general agreement on 
the principal changes which characterize 
this transformation: an increase in
human skills, a rise in the level of 
investment and savings, the adoption of 
more productive technology, a change in 
the composition of output, the develop­
ment of new institutions, etc. . . .
But there is considerable controversy as 
to the sequence of events comprising 
this process."6
They acknowledge their debt to Rostow in their per­
ception of the development process. In general, in their 
view, the pre-conditions for growth must be established 
before the "take-off." But foreign assistance is not 
restricted to increase the rate of investment but also to 
effect the changes that characterize the transformation:
"A country setting out to transform its 
economy without external assistance must 
provide for all the requirements of ac­
celerated growth from its own resources 
or from imports paid for by exports.
Success thus requires a simultaneous in­
crease in skills, organizational ability, 
domestic saving and export production, as 
well as an allocation of the increased 
resources in such a way as to satisfy the 
changing demands resulting from rising 
levels of income. The attempt to increase 
output can be frustrated by failures in 
any one of these attempts . . .  a shortage 
of skills in one case, a lack of savings 
in another, or inadequate export earnings 
in a third. When growth is limited in 
this way by a few bottlenecks, there is 
likely to be underutilization of other 
factors such as labor, natural resources, 
and specific types of productive capacity."7
16
Foreign assistance can then be useful by: first,
making possible the full use of domestic resources, thus 
facilitating accelerated growth; and second, making the timing 
of the changes accompanying the transformation more flexible.
sociated with a Phase of the transition: the skill limit,
associated with Phase I; the savings limit, corresponding 
to Phase II; and the foreign exchange limit, associated with 
Phase III. In general, the skill limit precedes always the 
others in time, while the sequence of the other limits 
would depend on the peculiarities of each country.^
Following McKinnon (1964), the formal presentation of 
the model would be as follows:
Assuming a simple, fixed proportions production 
function:
Three types of bottlenecks are identified, each as-
P = min (a • K^) a > 0 (2.1)
P : potential output capacity of the economy
a : output-domestic capital ratio
Kd: domestically produced capital goods
max S = s • Y 0 < s < 1 ( 2 . 2 )
S : domestic savings 
s : average propensity to save 




t i m e :
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From (2.3):
P = a • K (2.4)
Differentiating equation (2.4) with respect to
dP = a • dK (t) .v
dt dt
The rate of change in capital stock is, by defini­
tion, equal to net investment; i.e.:
dK _ T 
It ~ Xt
And since, It = St = s*Yt , 
we obtain,
g  - 0 -S-*t (2.6)
The equilibrium growth path is set so that domestic in­
come accommodates itself to capacity:
dt dt (z -7)
Then, equation (2.6) takes the form
H  = a -s.Yt (2.8)
Solving the above differential equation we get:
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a • s • t
(2.9)
which indicates that net national income grows at a constant 
rate w,
w = a • s
If a foreign exchange constraint is added, then 
equation (2 .1) becomes:
Thus, (3) becomes:
1/a + 1/3 ^
A new equation has to be introduced now, to take 
account of international trade:
P = min (a ‘ Kd, B ’Kf) (2.1')
where ICjj: domestically produced capital goods
Kf: foreign produced capital goods
B : output-foreign capital ratio
max Et = 5 ' Pt (2.10)
Et : exports, assumed to be solely constrained
by domestic capacity
For a foreign exchange constraint not to exist, it would be 
necessary that:
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Ift < max Et = £ ' Pf (2 .11)
If^ _: investment in foreign produced capital
goods
Now, as:
1 dP as „
I£ =  --------pt (2 .12)
t B dt 3
Then, condition (2:. 11) implies that:
22 pt < Z, Pt (2.13)
e
Then, for a foreign exchange constraint not to exist, it is 
necessary that:
as < E, 3 (2.14)
But if the constraint is present, then the maximum 
attainable level of investment in foreign produced capital 
goods would be equal to maximum exports (assuming no other 
imports requirements exist). So:
Ift - 5 Pt (2.15)
Substituting (2.15) in (2.12) and rearranging:
dP = 5 g p (2.16)
dt '~
Solving the differential equation yields:
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Pt = PG e ^t (2.17)
Assuming foreign transfers are possible,
It = St + Ft (2.18)
Ft: foreign transfers
Then f (= F/Y) could increase 5 in the case of a foreign ex­
change constraint, or increase s in the case of a savings 
constraint.
If we further add a skill limit constraint, then the 
alternative maximum attainable growth rates in income can be 
summarized as:
w = m skills limit
w = 3(5 + f) if 3(5 + f) < a(s + f), foreign exchange
limit
w = c t ( s  + f) if o(s + f) < 3(5 + F)» savings limit
McKinnon makes the point that, since 3 <a always
(because imported capital will always be only a fraction of 
total capital), then if a foreign exchange limit exists, it 
would always precede the savings limit (i.e., the foreign 
exchange constraint would be associated with Phase II of the 
transition). If it happens that 53 > as, which would justify 
the savings limit preceding the foreign exchange limit, then 
the only constraint ever binding growth would be that of 
savings.
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The skill limit is represented here as m. It is 
not strictly necessary for it to precede the other limits, 
and it is conceivable that whether it was present or not at 
low growth rates, it could appear at higher growth rates.
From the equations of the model the time path of 
foreign transfers can be determined, and the conditions 
established for foreign transfers to decline through time.
In the case of a savings limit, this condition will be that 
the marginal savings rate must be larger than the average; 
in the case of a foreign exchange limit, the marginal export 
rate must be larger than the average.
Finally, from the foreign transfers time path, the 
total amount of transfers necessary for a country to achieve 
self-sustained growth can be derived.
Many criticisms can be raised against these types of 
models. Perhaps the most important one is the critique 
against the assumption of a fixed coefficients production 
function, and the lack of substitutability between domestic 
and foreign capital. By doing so, the contribution to 
growth of other factors of production, like labor and natural 
resources, and factors affecting the productivity of inputs, 
like technology and institutional milieu, are excluded.
Associated with the former critique, the assumption 
of a fixed, exogenously determined incremental output-capital 
ratio, which is used as a parameter in all computations, is 
highly questionable. Many authors, including Leibenstein and 
Mikesell have suggested that this ratio is a function of the
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process of growth (and not a cause of it, as implied by the
model), and Singh (1975) found supporting evidence for that
contention.
The treatment given to the skill limit is another 
weak point. McKinnon (1964) does not make a full analysis of 
it, and Chenery and Strout (1966) reduce it to the differ­
ence between the capacity of a country to invest and its 
capacity to save, being the latter limited by institutional 
factors. And, in general, I agree with Mikesell in that the 
skill limit should not be separated from the savings and 
foreign exchange limit:
The skill level operates strongly at all
stages of development by keeping produc­
tivity low, holding down the level of 
productive investment and preventing the 
optimum allocation of a country's human 
and material resources. This limitation 
is the essence of being underdeveloped.9
Criticisms can be made also of the typical savings 
function assumed in these models. Despite the findings of 
cross country studies that there exists no correlation 
between income level and savings rates, the condition for 
aid to have a termination date is that as income rises, 
savings rates would also rise.
Another related question is the assumption that the 
savings function is independent from the factors determining 
the level of investment, in a dynamic context. A more ap­
propriate approach would be that the same forces which 
determine the level of investment and output in the economy, 
also determine the level of savings: institutional factors
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and government policies. In this sense, it can be argued 
that given the appropriate institutional framework, savings 
will be forthcoming for profitable investment opportunities.
Finally, as MikeselllO and B. Balassa^- point out, 
the savings and foreign exchange gaps have to be idential 
ex-post. That is to say, the difference between aggregate 
expenditure and income has to equal that between investment 
and savings, and that between imports and exports. The dif­
ference between both gaps appears because both are ex-ante 
estimates. But, as B. Cohen (1966) has contended, the ex- 
ante difference between the savings and the foreign exchange 
gaps would be evidence of misallocation of domestic resources. 
Consequently, filling the larger of the two gaps in any moment 
in time, as the Two-Gap Model proposes for each phase of the 
transition, would imply outright misallocation of resources.
2. Economic Development Potential Approach
While the approach followed by Chenery and 
Strout was aimed at estimating the performance of foreign 
aid granted to LDCs in terms of growth, and the cost in terms 
of foreign aid requirements, Adelman and Morris (1968) were 
concerned with the identification of countries with high 
prospects for growth. These would be candidates for receiving 
foreign aid:
This paper considers the problem of devising 
relatively objective criteria, based on 
past performance, for selecting underdeveloped 
countries with immediate development poten­
tial. The question is of practical importance 
to foreign aid policy, since those countries
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which are most rapidly adapting their 
. economic and socio-political organiza­
tion in a direction favorable to economic 
development are also those in which the 
economic productivity of foreign capital 
transfers is likely to be highest. Our 
concern, then, is with criteria for iden­
tifying a set of promising countries as 
potential foreign aid recipients.12
The way the criteria are determined is empirical
in nature:
. . .  it determines statistically by an 
analysis of variance, those linear com­
binations of country performance charac­
teristics which best discriminate among 
various groups of countries . . . The 
discriminant functions obtained in this 
manner can then be used to classify 
countries into performance groups with 
a high degree of reliability, using a 
relatively small number of performance 
characteristics.13
The application of this technique proceeds as follows. 
To begin, a group of countries is classified into three per­
formance groups: high, intermediate, and low growth poten­
tial. This classification is based on the assessment of 
GNP growth rate and seven characteristics: change in the
degree of industrialization since 1950; degree of improvement 
since 1950 in agricultural productivity, physical overhead 
capital, effectiveness of financial institutions, tax system, 
and the rate of investment. This classification is used 
later as a control group.
The next step is to collect 29 indicators of various 
broad aspects of economic, social and political characteris­
tics^ for the group of LDCs selected in the preceding step. 
The discriminant analysis operates through scanning the
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initial list of indicators, selecting those which add most to 
the explanation of the variance between group means, given 
the other indicators already included. Indicators are added 
successively to the function until no further reduction in 
the variance between group means can be achieved, at a 
5 percent significance level.
The best discriminant function thus determined was 
able to explain 97 percent of the overall variance, on the 
basis of four indicators:
Dx = . 71 F + .26 K + .52 M + .37 L (2.19)
Where F is the degree of improvement in financial institu­
tions, K is the degree of improvement in physical overhead 
capital, M is the degree of modernization of outlook, and 
L is the extent of leadership commitment to economic develop­
ment. According to the authors, the first two variables are 
broad indices of dynamic economic performance, M is a broad 
index of social development, and L is a broad index of the 
political climate.
It is important at this point to discuss the coverage 
of the variables found to be best discriminants, for a good 
deal of the criticisms against this technique centers on the 
nature of the variables included in the analysis, and 
particularly those finally selected. K includes improve­
ments in transport systems (roads and railroads). F is a 
composite of various indices of savings flowing through the 
banking system, and loans from the banking system to the
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private sector. M is a composite measure of modernization 
of outlook of educated urban groups, and of the extent to 
which programs of economic and political modernization have 
gained the support of both rural and urban populations. L 
was obtained on the basis of judgement of the following 
three categories: whether heads of central guidance agencies
make concerted efforts to promote economic growth; whether 
that effort was oriented to alter institutional arrangements 
blocking planning goals; and whether there was a government 
plan or not.
In order to get a measure of comparative discriminatory 
power, the discriminatory function D]^  is normalized, what 
yields:
Di = 127 F + 65 IC + 108 M + 72 L (2.20)
This result implies that the broad indices of social 
development (M) and political climate (L) are as important 
as the broad indices of dynamic economic performance in 
explaining LDCs1 economic development potential.
According to the authors, the advantage of this ap­
proach is that it makes possible to estimate the probability 
that a country belongs to a given development potential 
group, on the basis of its classification with respect to a 
very small number of indicators:
With the help of a discriminant function 
. . . and the most recent data on the 
variables appearing on it, one can compute 
an individual discriminant score for each
country. This discriminant score can then 
be used to calculate the group membership 
probabilities for each nation . . . The 
discriminant score then constitutes a 
single figure of merit which can meaning­
fully be used to assess the cumulative 
contributions of both domestic reform 
and external assistance to the raising 
of a country's development capacity.15
The empirical nature of this approach makes it very 
appealing, on the ground that the recommendations stemming 
from it would be based on broad indices of actual past per­
formance. Another strong point lies in its operational 
simplicity, given the small number of variables it demands 
to handle. The assumption that countries with high develop­
ment potential are also those where the contribution of aid 
to growth is likely to be higher, is quite reasonable.
Finally, the consistency between the classification performed 
by the use of discriminant function and that attained on the 
basis of individual assessment of each country (which I 
referred to as a control group) contributes to the accep­
tance of this technique.
Notwithstanding, the approach has fatal flaws in 
what pertains to the nature and coverage of some of the 
variables found to be best discriminants. It is easy to 
accept the inclusion of physical overhead capital improve­
ments: it can be associated with absorptive capacity con­
siderations and preconditions for growth. A case can be 
made that the development of financial intermediation is 
crucial for growth to take place. Certainly, improvements
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could be made in the coverage and measurement of these 
variables, as well as an analysis of their timing in the 
process of growth. Where the weakness is apparent is in 
those variables which are supposed to represent social 
development and political climate: their coverage is very
limited relative to the phenomenon they are intended to 
measure; and then, their measurement is highly questionable, 
to say the least.
Finally, even if we accepted these results as they 
are, the technique would still provide us only with very wide 
ranges of alternatives: we would still have the problem of
determining the levels of aid to be allocated to each of the 
countries with good prospects for growth.
3. Poverty-Focused Approach
This approach is the result of the combined 
efforts of a group of researchers of the Institute of Develop­
ment Studies (University of Sussex) and the Development Re­
search Center of the World Bank, and is presented in 
Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974).
Their point of departure is the belief that growth 
in LDCs has not benefited the poorer segments of the 
populations of those countries:
It is now clear that more than a decade 
of rapid growth in underdeveloped coun­
tries has been of little or no benefit 
to perhaps a third of their population.16
Moreover, the suspicion is broadly shared that growth
during the transition, and perhaps for many years after it has
been completed, tends to concentrate income making its dis­
tribution more unequal. In some cases, even absolute levels 
of poverty would be further depressed:
The fact of poverty is not new . . . What 
is new is the suspicion that economic 
growth by itself may not solve or even 
alleviate the problem within any "reason­
able" time period. Indeed it is often 
argued that the mechanisms which promote 
economic growth also promote economic 
concentration, and a worsening of the 
relative and perhaps even absolute -_ 
position of the lower-income groups. '
The authors proceed to propose a framework for the
analysis focused on three main aspects: one, an index of
social welfare that combines growth and distribution; two, 
a theory of growth cum distribution; and three, comparison 
of some alternative strategies of growth with redistribution.
Their welfare index is derived as follows. Let
1 ftus assume a multiplicative social-welfare function :J-°
N
W = (2 . 21)
where yj^: income of individual within income
class i
weight assigned to y ^
N : population of the country
If all individuals in income class i are assumed to 
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W = I I Y± (2.22)
i=l
where n-p number of individuals in income class i
k : number of income classes
Taking logs of (2.22): 
k
U = log W = £  n ^  log Y ± (2.23)
i=l
Total differentiation of (2.23) yields
k
dW V-1 dY.-
dU = —  = d log W = ) niPi yr1 (2.24)
W Z_.
i=l
According to the way weights are specified, dif­
ferent measures of welfare increases can be obtained.
CONVENTIONAL MEASURE: GNP growth rate.
Yi
gx = — > i.e., the weights are the shares of income 
Y






= g, i.e., all income classes are weighted in the 
same way. Income increases of lower- 
income classes are equally weighted to 




^  = V  Hi (2.26)
Ne Z_I N Yi
i=l
Specification (2.26) implies that social welfare 
increases are a function of the income growth rates in each 
income class, weighted by the share of population in income 
class i in total population.
POVERTY WEIGHTS MEASURE: This measure is obtained when dif­
ferent weights are assigned to the 
income increases of different socio-economic groups. These 
socio-economic groups can be defined as income classes (say, 
quintiles, deciles, etc.) or target groups (self-employed 
small farmers, rural artisans, members of the urban "informal" 
sector, etc.).
Dividing (2.24) throughout by I ni3i> we 8et:
-I
i=l




dU = V *  ni i dYi (2.27)
Z_j Eni3i Yi
The specific weight assigned to each group is a matter
of policy decision. Measure (2.27) therefore provides an
index for assessing the impact of redistributive policies.
Their theory of growth and distribution is based on
a set of findings and premises. The authors contend that:
. . . the objective of distributive justice 
is more usefully conceived of as accelerating 
the development of the poorer groups in 
society rather than in terms of relative 
shares of income. °
Consequently, a theory of income distribution should 
give explicit treatment to asset distribution and income 
linkages between socio-economic groups. Asset distribution 
is crucial. Given it tends to be even more concentrated than 
the distribution of incomes, unless some increase in capital 
stock owned or controlled by the poor is effected . . . "it 
seems almost inevitable that their per capita income will 
grow more slowly than that of higher income groups, at least 
for a considerable period."^0 Income linkages, on the other 
hand, impose important policy constraints: for example, tax
financed transfers from the rich to the poor may raise the 
income of the poor but, if they reduce savings and capital 
accumulation by the rich, they may in time lead to lower 
income in the poorer groups.
The different strategies of growth cum distribution 
and their implications can be summarized as follows:
i) Maximizing the growth of GNP (Gross National 
Product) would benefit all groups in the 
long-run. However, because of the weak linkages between the 
poverty groups and the rest of the economy, their incomes 
would lag until the expansion of employment creates an upward 
pressure on wages. This may take a considerable period of 
time. Therefore, welfare could always be improved in the 
short-run by adding transfers to the poor.
ii) Transfers of income in support of the poor
would raise welfare in the short run, but
could have too high a cost in terms of foregone investment
to be viable on a large scale over an extended period of 
time.
iii) Asset redistribution in favor of the poor is
likely to be hampered by political resistance, 
even though in some specific areas it may be feasible (land 
reform, for instance). Increased investment in the physical 
and human assets of the poor is more likely to have political 
acceptance, though. Welfare would still be higher than in 
strategy (i) in the short run, and indeed in the long run. 
Moreover, even incomes of the upper-income groups may benefit 
in the long-run, because of the "trickle up" effects of 
greater productivity and purchasing power of the poor. The 
specific strategy for a particular country would be a combina­
tion of the ones sketched above, according to its political, 
social and economic peculiarities.
if
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However appealing this approach may be, it is not 
free of criticism. To begin with it is subject to all 
criticisms applicable to "programming models." The role 
assigned to the government can also be questioned, espe­
cially in reference to the impact of government interven­
tion on the development of a vigorous domestic group of 
entrepeneurs, and more generally, the development of a 
dynamic private economy. The stress that emphasis on re­
distribution policies puts on growth at early stages of the 
process of development is another question of primary impor- 
tnace. After all, the experience of recent decades shows 
that growth is feasible in LDCs. Imposing redistributive 
constraints may seriously affect growth, and thus maintaining 
or even perhaps increasing the gaps between DCs and LDCs. 
Finally, if growth in LDCs were not to be sacrificed, then 
aid flows should increase considerably, problem not likely 
to have an adequate response in the near future.
Notwithstanding, World poverty is a matter that some­
how needs to be addressed. This approach is useful in pro­
viding an analytical framework, but the application of re­
distributive policies will depend heavily on the availability 
of foreign aid.
To end, if the intra-country distributional implica­
tions are set aside, this approach provides a powerful frame­
work to analyze the inter-country welfare implications of 
foreign aid-induced growth.
Ill. Studies on Actual Aid Allocation
Because the Two-Gap Model reviewed in the previous 
Section has gained so broad acceptance, it has significantly 
influenced donors' aid allocation policies in the past. The 
Economic Development Potential approach, though, has not en­
joyed the same recognition, because of the reasons mentioned 
before. The Poverty Focused approach has been developed in 
recent years.
Whether we agree or not with the preceding assessment, 
the fact is that the prevalent paradigm in the recent past 
proposes a set of aid allocation criteria that bears a close 
association with those derivable from the Two-Gap and related 
models. These criteria can conveniently be summarized as 
past growth performance, self-help measures and policies 
aimed at removing bottlenecks, and need measured in terms of 
aid requirements for filling gaps or per capita income.
The purpose of this Section is to provide an over­
view of studies which were aimed at testing the rationale 
implicit in actual (as opposed to desirable) aid allocations. 
The conclusions reached in those studies have provided the 
justification for the normative models of aid allocation 
developed in the past, which are reviewed in Section IV.
1. OECD-DAC* Secretariat Studies
Various attempts were made aimed at "explaining" 
the geographic distribution of aid for the period 1960-1967,
■>'Development Assistance Committee of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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by correlating aid receipts and such factors as: mobiliza­
tion of domestic resources (savings rate); the efficiency 
of investment (capital-output ratio); need (per capita in­
come) ; and absorptive capacity (rate of return on invest­
ment) .22 No significant relationship was found between aid 
receipts and any of these factors.
Notwithstanding, these studies did find that bilateral 
and multilateral flows were equally dispersed, and that both 
kinds of flows, when expressed in per capita terms, were 
highly correlated to each other. That is to say, both kinds 
of flows showed similar distributional patterns, rather than 
one "balancing" the other. This led to the hypothesis that 
there exists a "bandwagon" effect in the allocation of aid.
Another finding was the "inertia" in aid flows: 
the tendency for countries to receive this year more or less
O O
what they received last year. J
Finally, a marked tendency was found for each country 
to receive a minimum amount, regardless of its size, plus a 
certain amount related to the size of its population. This 
phenomenon was labeled as the "small-country effect."2^
2. Aid, Performance, Self-Help and Need- Strout 
and Clark (1969)
The purpose of this study was to test the degree 
of association between Net Official Flows (NOF) of aid and 
AID requests for Fiscal Year 1969,* and:
*NOF are disbursements of aid net of repayments of 
principal and interest, as reported by the DAC of OECD.
AID is the Agency for International Development 
of the U. S. Department of State.
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. . . three inter-country standards which 
are frequently regarded as important to 
country aid decisions:
1. Growth performance, as reflected in a 
set of statistical indicators of recent 
economic expansion and allocation of 
resources to growth.
2. Policy performance, or self-help, as 
reflected in development policies 
actually pursued as compared with 
policies which might reasonably be 
expected.
3. Income and balance of payments need, 
as reflected in the level of per 
capita income and in the gap between 
"normal" imports and actual export 
earnings.25
The study was conducted for a set of 43 under­
developed countries and a subsample of 19 countries of spe­
cial AID interest, for the period 1961-1963 to 1965-1967. 
Actual aid flows were considered as a ratio to imports, 
investment and population. The variables subjected to 
statistical analysis were the ranks, for each category.
The simple rank correlation between the two principal 
aid measures (NOF and AID requests for FY 1969) and the three 
inter-country standards considered independently, produced 
the following results:
. . . aid flows (as we prefer to measure them) 
appear to have little relationship to past 
growth performance, a significant positive 
relationship to recent policy performance, 
and a clear positive relationship to our 
combined measure of need.26
In this respect, however, it is important to remark 
that: first, these results are based on simple rank cor­
relations; second, the highest correlation with respect to
& * & * » <
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recent policy performance is .56; third, the relationship 
with the combined measure of country need may be spurious, 
since aid is expressed relative to imports, and need is 
partly measured by the import gap.
When a multiple correlation was performed between the 
ranks of NOF aid flows (relative to imports) and the ranks of 
the three inter-country standards as explanatory variables, 
no association was found between aid flows and overall growth 
performance and policy performance for the sample of 43 
countries, while a positive significant association with the 
combined need standard (which includes the import gap) was 
observed. Even in this questionable case, only 57 percent 
of the aid allocation was "explained." And for the subsample 
of 19 countries, aid flows were positively correlated (as 
expected) with the need and overall performance standards, 
negatively correlated (contrary to expectations) with overall 
growth performance. Moreover, none of the coefficients were 
significant at the 5 percent level, and only 48 percent of 
the aid allocation ranks was explained.27
3. Foreign Assistance Objective and Consequences 
- Griffin and Enos (1970)
This study is an attack against the doctrine in­
forming foreign assistance, and the perversive effects foreign 
aid has, in the authors1 view, over LCDs. Rather than ad­
dressing the subject of aid allocation, the authors question 
the necessity and convenience of foreign assistance. Their
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method of analysis, they warn in the first place, is more
intuitive than scientific.
Their point of departure is that:
To the capitalist countries - from whence 
most aid comes - it is a way of safeguarding 
relationships with their client states, of 
maintaining the status quo.28
A simple regression analysis between the growth rate 
of GNP and aid per capita, for 15 African and Asian coun­
tries for the period 1962-1964, shows no significant rela­
tionship between the variables. On this basis they suggest 
that:
. . . If growth which a nation achieves, or 
fails to achieve, is related to the assis­
tance it receives, one finds that there is
no support for the view that aid encourages 
growth.29
Another regression, performed this time for a sample
of 12 Latin American countries, for the averages between
1957-1964, shows a significant but negative association
between growth rate in income and aid per capita (it also
shows that only 13 percent of the income growth rate is
explained by per capita aid). This result, in conjunction
with the former, leads them to argue that growth in income
cannot be related to per capita aid because, contrary to two-
gap models and aid practitioners' expectations, foreign aid
substitutes for domestic savings.30
Furthermore, the authors claim that:
. . . aid may not only lead to lower 
savings, it may also retard long-run 
economic growth by altering the
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composition of investment to the dis­
advantage of the receiving country.31
This is because part of aid is provided for non­
productive uses; and when aid is provided for productive 
uses, then it promotes capital intensive techniques that do 
not favor employment and establish few linkages with the 
rest of the economy.
Finally, they contend that foreign capital, particu­
larly when it takes the form of direct private investment, 
hinders the development of local entrepreneurship, which they 
see as instrumental for the process of growth.
This study has been much criticized. Many of its 
contentions are not supported with evidence, and the evi­
dence presented is clearly insufficient. Nevertheless, it 
is a highly suggestive study.
4. The Distribution of Official Development Assis­
tance Commitments by Recipient Countries and by Source - P. D. 
Henderson (1971)
The purpose of Henderson's study is to bring 
out certain general features of the distribution of official 
aid. No a priori hypothesis is formulated, but rather a 
group of plausible explanatory variables are included in the 
analysis. The focus is on aid commitments (as opposed to 
disbursed aid) of Official Development Assistance, both bi­
lateral and multilateral.
The study considers 89 LDCs, for the period 1967-1968, 
and comprises two parts. The first one deals with rank
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correlations between ODA commitments per head and size of a 
country (as measured by population), GNP per head, and past 
GNP per head growth rate.
No association was found between ODA per head and the 
growth rate of GNP per head, a positive but not significant 
association with GNP per head, and a strong negative asso­
ciation with country size. This result can be interpreted 
as a confirmation of the "small-country effect" postulated 
by the DAC Secretariat. His conclusion is that:
. . . the main explanatory factor in 
determining the allocation of official 
development assistance is a country's 
population, with a pronounced tendency 
for per capita aid receipts to diminish
with size.32
The second part of the study consists of a stepwise 
analysis of a number of variables that could qualify as 
explanation for the variations in per capita aid. This 
statistical procedure is justified on the grounds that any 
a priori hypothesis of a number of alternative explanations 
seems equally plausible.
The variables included in the analysis are: size
of a country (measured by its population); ratio of imports 
to GNP; country's per capita income; and income growth rate 
in the five years preceding 1968. Dummy variables are also 
included to differentiate four categories of performance 
ratings, four categories of creditworthiness, and four geo­
graphical regions.
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Neither the performance, creditworthiness nor geo­
graphical regions dummies proved to be significant. Of the
other variables, the only one that was found to be signifi­
cant was population size.
Henderson concludes his study by observing that:
. . . first, the amount of aid received
by a country is related to its population
size, but, and this is our second con­
clusion, the relationship is perhaps a 
complex one, and differs from region to 
region.33
5. A Model of the Supply of Bilateral Foreign Aid 
- Dudley and Montmarquette (1976)
Instead of looking upon the subject from the 
standpoint of aid requirements for growth, or need, Dudley 
and Montmarquette approach the question by considering aid 
as a good which is indirectly consumed by the residents of 
the donor country. Their purpose, then, is to develop a 
theory of the supply of foreign aid.
Their basic assumption is that "people usually give 
because they expect to get something in return." Though 
altruism at an individual level is possible, at the social 
level it is very unlikely. Transfers of public funds from 
one society to another, then, would be based on the following 
expectations: the recipient nation will behave more favor­
ably toward the donor country; the recipient will confer 
economic preferences to the donor (e.g., buying more of the 
products they export); and some indication that aid has had 
a favorable impact in the recipient country that may be 
reciprocated in the future.
A further assumption is that the volume of these 
return flows depends on the flow of foreign aid to the 
recipients. Thus:
The supply of foreign aid is then 
explained by the demand by the donor 
country for the impact its aid has 
on the recipient country.34
Their next step is to develop two models of the
supply of foreign aid: one with no administrative costs,
and the other with positive administrative costs.
The model with no administrative costs is:
X: total consumption of other goods
H: consumption of the subjectively measured
impact of foreign aid, treated as a 
private good
H 'is then defined as the sum of the impacts of 
donor's aid on receiving countries:
U = f(X, H) (2.28)




where Hj: subjectively measured impact on recipient j
nj: population of recipient j
aj: aid per capita received by country j
per capita GNP of country j
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The impact function Hj is assumed to take the form:
Hj = n.a 0 1 a i l ,  O i y i l  (2.30)
The budget constraint for the donor country is
expressed as:
X + Zn j aj = Y (2.31)
where Y : GNP of donor country
Maximization of U subject to (2.29), (2.30), and
(2.31) yields the amount of aid to be allocated to each 
country:
perception of the impact of its aid 
y: indicator of the extent of decreasing
returns in the creation of impact 
k: marginal rate of substitution between aid
impact to each country, and the other good
One of the implications of this formulation is that 





where a: measure of the distortion in the donor's
---
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When administrative costs are added, budget con­
straint (2.31) becomes:
X + [Zajnj ' c(ajnj)6] = Y 0 < 6 < 1 (2.33)
where c is a constant, and the range of values assigned
assumes that the administrative costs of aid increase less
than proportionally with the amount of aid.
In this case, the amount of per capita aid to be 
allocated to each country becomes:
ot-1 _y  Y-l
aj = (k y nj yj - c y nj ) (2.34)
This equation established that aid would be positive 
only for countries larger than some minimum size, and that 
aid would rise with population up to a certain size and 
decrease thereafter.
Variables other than population and per capita in­
come are then postulated that affect the impact of aid: 
existence of previous political ties, economic ties, and 
a "bandwagon effect," are examples. These can be included 
in the analysis through impact function Hj, and would reflect 
upon the determination of aj.
Empirical estimation of the model considered 15 coun­
tries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee of 
OECD, and was applied to the 1970 bilateral aid commitments. 
The results confirmed that the decision of granting aid or 
not to a specific country was a decreasing function of the
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recipient's per capita income, as well as a function of 
economic, political and bandwagon considerations. On the 
other hand, because of decreasing marginal administrative 
costs, the probability of granting aid increased with the 
recipient country's population.
Once the decision of granting aid to a specific 
country has been made, the results suggest there is no 
uniform evidence of distortion in favor of smaller coun­
tries (contradicting the "small country effect" found in 
previous studies). Finally, there appear to be strongly 
decreasing returns to a donor in converting its foreign aid 
into impact on a given recipient country (suggesting that 
donor countries would in general get more in return from
the aid granted if it is well spread among the receiving
countries, rather than concentrated in a few).
The importance of the study, over and above the
novelty of its approach, lies in the inclusion of a budget
constraint. This approach can both be viewed as a method 
for the analysis of actual aid allocations, as well as a 
methodology for allocating aid: a utility function is
maximized subject to a resource availability constraint. 
Indeed, given the premises of the model (donor countries 
provide aid because of what they expect to get in return, 
which includes economic benefits) an extension of the model 
should incorporate the effects upon donors' GNP of the 
economic benefits received in return.
6. Biases in Aid Allocation A g a i n s t  Poorer and 
Larger Countries - P. Isenman (1976)
Isenman's study is intended to analyze the 
statistical determinants of the past inter-country alloca­
tions of aid and the feasibility of ameliorating the ap­
parent biases which emerge.
The author contends that past aid allocations can 
be "explained" by three factors. The first one is the 
"middle income bias" (MIB), such that:
. . . in spite of the desire to help poor 
countries, aid will raise with income up 
to some point (which may itself vary with 
country size or political bias), and then 
decline.35
He hypothesizes that the explanation of this bias 
can be found in the allocation criteria that have been ap­
plied by donors, which are positively related to per capita 
income: performance, aid needs to fill gaps, quantity and
quality of projects submitted to the consideration of aid 
agencies, and absorptive capacity considerations. There 
would be, though, countervailing forces in the form of reluc 
tance by donors to help countries that appear relatively 
less needy.
The second factor is the "country-size bias" (CSB), 
previously known as "small-country effect": smaller coun­
tries are likely to receive more aid per capita than large 
ones. The explanations he proposes in this case are: the 
importance of the nation-state (in terms of vote in the U. N 
for instance); the practice of granting aid in proportion
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to imports (smaller countries tend to trade a larger portion 
of their product); economies of scale in technical assistance 
and in the administration of aid programs, etc.
And third, a number of other factors: special poli­
tical relationships, the recipient's balance of payments 
situation, and some performance indicators.
The study was conducted for a variety of categories 
of aid (NOF, ODA, and grant equivalent ODA), and for a 
variety of donors: Total DAC USAID (bilateral), World Bank
(nominal and in grant equivalent), and UNDP. The period 
covered ranged from 1969 to 1972, according to aid category. 
Aid was expressed both in per capita terms and total dollar 
value, regressed against population and GNP of recipient 
(both in a simple and quadratic form), an appropriate balance 
of payments measure, an appropriate political variable, and 
an appropriate measure of performance or self-help.
The results confirmed the "country-size bias" in aid 
allocation (per capita and total dollar amounts) for all 
categories considered. The "middle-income bias" was simi­
larly confirmed, except for IDA and UNDP. The balance of 
payments gap and political variables were significant in 
some cases, and measures of absorptive capacity and self- 
help were insignificant in all cases.
In summary, the results confirm previous findings, 
only for a much broader coverage of categories of aid and 
a greater variety of donors. Therefore, the results at­
tained in Isenman's study are more general. Another
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contribution of his work is the identification of a new sta­
tistical determinant of past aid allocations, namely, the 
"middle-income bias." In this respect, though, it is worth 
noting that at least part of this bias is closely associated 
with the "country-size bias," for in the sample of countries 
used, GNP and population are highly correlated (R^ = .50). 
Notwithstanding, provided that the degree of association 
between GNP and population for much larger samples than the 
one used here ha not been found to be significant, it can be 
argued that, in general, both biases are susceptible of 
strict identification. But that is something that has not 
yet been tested.
The findings of the studies that we have just re­
viewed are rather limited. Apart from the identification of 
some "statistical" determinants of past aid allocations, no 
further advances have been made. Moreover, if compared 
with the findings of the DAC Secretariat, no major progress 
has been achieved during a decade, and even then, the 
results bear no more association with scientific aid alloca­
tion criteria than the explanations suggested by these 
authors, more on intuitive than scientific grounds. In 
fact, the empirical evidence about the degree of association 
between aid allocation and "broadly agreed" or "frequently 
regarded as important" aid criteria (intended to represent 
growth performance, growth potential and need) support 
opposing views.
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One cannot but fully agree, then, with Mikesell's 
(1968, p. 267) conclusion that: "It is impossible to dis­
cern any economic rationale for the distribution of aid, 
either overall or by agency or donor country."
IV. Past Normative Models of Aid Allocation
The results reported in the previous Section seriously 
question the appropriateness of the actual pattern of geo­
graphical distribution of aid. Some authors have blamed 
this failure on the political decision processes necessarily 
involved in matters like this. But that has too often been 
the excuse offered by Economists to justify their short­
comings .
Other authors have set themselves to the more produc­
tive task of devising methodologies specifically aimed at 
the determination of "desirable" aid allocation patterns.
I report here two of those attempts, which are closely related 
in approach and methodology with the task I have set for 
myself.
1. Performance Criteria and Multilateral Aid 
Allocation
The first of the attempts reported here is that 
of Cline and Sargen (1975). Their purpose is to propose a 
normative model for the allocation of aid according to two 
criteria: equity and country performance.
On a priori basis, they consider first what they 
regard as "desirable properties of a new model for aid
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allocation" (Cline and Sargen, 1975, p. 384): one, it should
incorporate equity, i.e., aid should be directly related to 
poverty; two, the allocational system should contain positive 
incentives, such that good performance be rewarded with 
more aid rather than punished with less, up to a ceiling, 
cut-off per capita income level; three, the performance judge­
ment should be based on measurable economic policies consid­
ered to be responsible for growth; and four, a practical al­
locational system should harmonize recommended aid levels with 
aggregate aid available from donors. It is easy to find the 
connection between these principles and improvements over 
the approaches of Chenery and Strout (1966) and Adelman and 
Morris (1968), which the authors chose as reference.
basis of the maximization of a general welfare function con­
strained by a given amount of aid, they postulate a simple 
incremental per capita income to incremental per capita aid 
relationship:
The system they propose is developed next. On the
ao “ bYi (2.35)
where a-L: grant equivalent assistance per capita
to country i 




n^: population of country i
A : aggregate grant equivalent aid available
And:
a ± - byu = 0 (2.37)
yu : cut-off per capita income level
Solving for a± in (2.35) subject to (2.36) and (2.37), 
the "standard profile".per capita aid is obtained:
_  <yu  " yi>
a^ = a -------—  (2.38)
(yu - y)
where a: aid pool divided by total population of
recipient countries 
y: total income of recipient countries divided
by their total population
The "standard profile" indicates how the available 
pool of aid should be divided if only equity considerations 
were taken into account. To include performance, it has 
to be adjusted upward or downward according to a performance 
measure that is postulated as a composite of five influences: 
savings effort, export effort, inflation policy, tax effort, 
and efficiency in resource use as measured by the incre­
mental output-capital ratio.
Each of the performance influences is specified ac­
cording to appropriate assumptions and hypotheses. Then,
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they are combined into a single composite performance indi­
cator by assigning a priori, arbitrary weights to each of 
them.
This composite performance variable is transformed 
into a multiplier, through a quadratic function which is 
forced to unity for the average performance level, 0 for 
the minimum level, and 2 for the maximum level.
Introduction of this multiplier into (2.38) yields:
ai “ “iTi  ---  (2-39)
L S a ±Vin ±)
a^: recommended grant equivalent aid per
capita to country i
The application of the model to the aid allocation 
of the World Bank for a group of 19 major recipients for 
fiscal years 1969-1972 is of no relevance for my present 
purposes. It suffices to mention that actual aid allocation 
was found to have only a weak association to country perfor­
mance : the only performance indicator that shows influence
on lending allocation is that of savings; per capita income 
level shows no influence; and the most powerful explanatory 
variable is "other aid," which again confirms the "bandwagon 
effect" previously mentioned in the literature.
The most important features of this approach are the 
proposition of a set of desirable properties that a system 
of allocation should have, and the derivation of an alloca­
tion index on the basis of the maximization of a welfare
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function constrained by the available pool of aid. The 
authors seem not to realize (or fail to make an explicit 
point of it) that both contributions can be related to each 
other. Therefore, the desirable properties have to be ac­
cepted as an a priori construction. On the other hand, the 
allocation index, though based on an adequate theoretical 
framework, is too quickly transformed into an empirical con­
struction, without an adequate analysis of its theoretical 
implications.
Another step not sufficiently justified is the selec­
tion of performance influences, even though the authors seem 
to imply it was done "on the basis of the current state of 
knowledge about the development process." It is clear from 
the review performed in the previous sections that the cur­
rent state of knowledge about the development process is 
far apart from a general consensus. Finally, though the 
authors cannot be blamed for not making reference to it, the 
a priori weights assigned to each of these performance 
indices to form the composite performance index are ques­
tionable by definition.
In sum, their two contributions (the desirable 
properties of a system of allocation, and the allocation 
index) are highly promising, but the authors failed to take 
full advantage of their potential.
2. Aid and Income Distribution
This paper by Edelman and Chenery had two pur­
poses: one, to "give an empirical analysis of the factors
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affecting the allocation of aid in the recent past"; two, 
to provide "a basis for judging the possibilities for im­
proving aid allocation in the future" (Edelman and Chenery,
similar to that one employed by Isenman (1976), and the 
results are in line with those attained in that study, as 
well as in most of the other studies reviewed in Section III.
tion of the Poverty Focused Approach to the inter-country 
allocation of aid. Their aim is to assess the potential for 
reallocation of aid, on the basis of a welfare-increases 
measure:
weights measure" proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974), 
and reported in Section II. In this case, though, its ap­
plication is focused on inter-country comparisons of growth 
cum distribution. The unit of analysis here is the country, 
and growth in income of richer countries is weighted equally 
to that in poorer countries.
1977, p. 27).
The first purpose pursues a methodology that is
The second part of the study consists of an applica-
(2.40)
where n^: population of country i
N : Ent
gi: rate of GNP growth in country i, due to
receipts of foreign aid
This welfare measure corresponds to the "equal
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Since the aim of this exercise is to analyze the 
impact of foreign aid on social welfare, a further necessary 
step is to restrict the growth in income to that part which 
would result from different levels of foreign aid. There­
fore, W measures the.population weighted growth rate in 
income due to receipts of aid.
In order to estimate the growth in income due to aid, 
it is assumed that the productivity of aid is the same as 
the overall productivity of capital in these economies. Then
A 1dY* = ------ Ai (2.41)
ICORi
where dY^: income increases due to foreign aid
in group of countries i 
ICOR^: incremental capital-output ratio of
group of countries i 
Ai: aid level to countries i
Replacing (2.41) into (2.40) yields:
= V  ^
Z - i  N
(1/ICORj)
W )  i- At (2.42)
 Y.jLi
On the basis of relationship (2.42) the growth rate 
in W is computed.^6 These computations permit the authors 
to discuss the potential for reallocation of aid and to make 
a case in favor of poorer countries.
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There are three methodological aspects I will dis­
cuss in reference to this application of the Poverty-Focused 
Approach to aid allocation.
The first one is the use of the ICOR as a proxy for 
the productivity of foreign aid. It is obvious this assump­
tion can only be justified if no direct measurement, or a 
better proxy were available. Yet, there is no reason for 
foreign and domestic capital productivities to be equal, and 
generally, one would expect foreign capital productivity to 
be higher than that of domestic capital.^7
A second aspect, related to the former, is the static
nature of the application. That is to say, no account is
taken of the effect of different aid levels on the produc­
tivity of aid and/or per capita income level. We know that
more aid will be associated with a higher level of per capita
income (ceteris paribus), and production theory tells us 
that average and marginal productivities of an input are 
a function of the quantity of that input being used.
The former is not just a methodological shortcoming, 
but it also restricts the validity of the case made by the 
authors. In fact, total differentiation of (2.42) yields:
* (1/ICORi) , 
dW = > —  — ---- —  dAi (2.43)Zni ( N Yi
Given that n^, N, ICOR^, and (initial income level) are 
assumed to be constant, then the maximum increase in the rate
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of growth in W would be achieved if all aid were allocated 
to the country with the highest incremental output-capital 
ratio relative to initial per capita income. In their 
example, the group of poorer countries have the highest ratio, 
so that if all aid were granted to these countries, the 
growth rate in W would be the maximum attainable, given a
OO
level of aid. Albeit that recommendation would not be 
rejectable per se,^ in reality the effect of aid would be 
felt in the productivity of capital and the level of income. 
So, "corner solutions" as this would not permit attainment 
of the highest attainable growth in W.
But the major limitation of this static approach 
would lie in its application to the allocation of aid to 
specific countries. According to the implications of this 
approach, the highest growth in W would be attained if all 
aid were granted to the country with the highest growth cum 
distribution index. If the deviations from the goal were 
expected to be high in the previous case (when allocation 
between groups of countries was discussed), it is evident 
those deviations would be even higher at a desaggregated 
level.
The third and final aspect is that this application 
never addresses the problem of maximizing the growth in the 
welfare measure. Consequently, the discussion of the poten­
tial for reallocation is not sufficiently justified on 




The conclusion that there is no discernible economic 
rationale in past aid allocation is both disconcerting ’and 
provocative. It is disconcerting, for one cannot but ques­
tion the effectiveness of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid 
Agencies. One could reasonably expect them to allocate aid 
in some way consistent with its growth impact, its potential 
productivity, past performance, and need (however measured).
In some cases, particularly for bilateral aid, one might 
also expect political variables to play a significant role.
The findings contradict our expectations.
If we assume, then, that these agencies have at least 
attempted to provide an economic rationale to aid allocation, 
but have failed to do so, other sort of questions arise. Why 
is it that while other branches of Economics have compiled a 
relatively good record, the Economics of Foreign Aid has 
fared so badly? What is it in the method and approach that 
explains such diverse records? Finally, would it not have 
been better (and cheaper . . .) to allocate aid according 
to some proportionality rule,^ rather than subjecting it to 
the outcome of program and project evaluations, overall 
economic assessments, consultations, and so on? The lack 
of an economic rationale in aid allocation is provocative, 
since it is an issue with as yet no acceptable solution. It 
should be clear by now that there is a lack of association 
between past inter-country allocations of aid and economic factors 
broadly agreed to influence the process of economic growth.
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This is the justification for dedicating myself to the task 
of devising a normative model of aid allocation.
* ',r' Past normative models of aid allocation reviewed in 
Section IV have attempted to provide a methodology to recon­
cile, in the process of aid allocation, certain agreed pur­
poses foreign aid should serve, and the availability of aid. 
The discussion in Section IV concentrated on the particular 
shortcomings of the models reviewed. Therefore, here I will 
deal exclusively with two general methodological features of 
those attempts that I consider objectionable.
In devising a normative model for aid allocation 
two primal questions have to be answered. The first one is 
what criteria for allocating aid should be used, and the 
direction of the association those criteria should bear to 
aid. That is to say, how do we justify the contention that 
performance indicators should be considered, and how do we 
justify that aid should be positively associated with per­
formance? Or, why should need be considered, and why should 
it be rewarded with more aid? The answer seems to be ob­
vious , but it is as well to remember that the most obvious 
things are frequently the most important.
The answer to this question depends on the purposes 
foreign aid is defined to serve. As such, it is a matter of 
social preferences: foreign aid objectives can be defined
to be the promotion of growth in LDCs (as done in the Two- 
Gap Model and the Economic Development Potential approach),
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or to increase welfare (as done in the Poverty-Focused ap­
proach) .
The analysis of past normative models shows that Cline 
and Sargen (1975) do not develop their criteria in a system­
atic way. The consideration of growth preformance indices 
seems to be in line with theories which view growth as the 
primary objective of foreign aid; the equity criteria, as 
represented by the dictum that richer countries should re­
ceive less per capita aid, is simply postulated. The direc­
tion of association is susceptible to the same criticism. 
Therefore, this question is answered in this case almost 
exclusively on a priori grounds.
In the case of the model proposed by Edelman and 
Chenery (1977), the criteria they use and their direction of 
association with aid is derived from Ahluwalia and Chenery 
(1974), where they are strictly justified.
The second primal question to be addressed is that 
of justifying the selection of specific indices to represent 
or approximate the criteria previously selected. This is 
not merely a matter of hypothesizing a particular mathematical 
formulation susceptible to statistical analysis, but princi­
pally, of justifying the existence of a clear relationship 
between the indices selected and the criteria they are in­
tended to represent. For instance, performance criteria are 
sometimes represented by past growth rates in income, at 
other times by potential growth capabilities, and even by 
policy measures assumed to reflect upon future outcomes.
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Need criteria is another area where fishing for proxies is 
prevalent practice. On the light of this second question, 
we find that Cline and Sargen (1975) do not justify their 
selection of specific indices at all. And Edelman and 
Chenery (1977) do not fare much better when they assume the 
productivity of foreign aid to be equal to the overall 
productivity of capital in the economy.
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2®Griffin and Enos (1970), p. 316.
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30singh (1975), on the basis of a much larger and
thorough empirical study, found that aid substitutes for
domestic savings when its amount relative to GNP is small.
^Griffin and Enos (1970), p. 323.
32Henderson (1971), p. 5.
^Henderson (1971), pp. 6 and 19.
34Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), p. 132.
35isenman (1976), p. 632.
3^See Edleman and Chenery (1977), p. 46.
37This expectation is better understood if we think 
in terms of foreign capital being a constraint for growth 
in LDCs.
38The growth in W if their proposed reallocation 
were effected would be 3.87 percent, as compared to one of 
3.47 percent if equal amounts of aid were granted to both 
groups of countries. If all aid were allocated to poorer 
countries, the growth in W would then be 5.71 percent.
^Giving all aid to some group of countries implies 
not giving aid at all to others. This idea has been proposed 
also by Cline and Sargen (1975), when they postulate a cut-off 
per capita income level above which no aid should be granted, 
and by Singh (1975), as an implication of his findings (Singh, 
1975, pp. 229-230).
40By this I mean, if growth is emphasized, then the 
relative growth rates in income would provide the index, if 
equity is emphasized, then allocate aid according to popula­
tion shares, etc.
CHAPTER III 
A MODEL FOR THE ALLOCATION OF AID
I. Introduction
The theoretical model I propose here attempts to 
give an adequate response to the questions raised in Chapter 
Two. My contention is that if a world social welfare func­
tion, defined in terms of income level increases due to 
foreign aid, is maximized subject to the availability of 
aid, it yields an allocation index which defines the relevant 
variables and their direction of association with aid. The 
allocation system obtained in this manner has the following 
properties: one, aid is directly related to performance as
measured by the marginal productivity of aid; two, aid is 
directly related to relative poverty as measured by per capita 
income; three, the combined world social welfare - derived 
from aid is maximized; and four, aid allocation is harmonized 
with aid availability.
This model is an application of the Growth cum Dis­
tribution approach to the problem of foreign aid allocation. 
The scope of the analysis centers on the growth impact of aid 
and its distributional effects as related to the allocation 
of aid between LDCs, setting aside growth and distribution 
effects of aid within each country.
An approach emphasizing intra-country income distri­
bution considerations would entail redefining the units of 
analysis; instead of the unit country, now the unit would be
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the "target" or income groups within each country. And the 
system of allocation so defined would have to guarantee that 
the contribution to LDCs' world social welfare of aid induced 
welfare increases of target or income groups in all countries 
be equal at the margin. The underlying rationale of such 
system would be that poverty groups are worthy of ass istence 
irrespective of the overall degree of development of the 
country where they happen to live.-^ -
However appealing such an approach may be, it has 
serious empirical and theoretical shortcomings. Lack of 
data about present income distributions, lack of identifica­
tion of "target" groups within each country (which would 
require knowledge about income linkages of those groups with 
the rest of the economy), and lack of knowledge about social 
preferences in each country as to how they prefer to attack 
poverty within their boundaries, are only part of the limita­
tions. Concerns about the long-run growth prospects, and 
ultimately long-run LDCs' welfare, is another element that 
makes this approach criticizable. These considerations lead 
me to focus my attention in the more limited but less ques­
tionable subject of aid allocation between LDCs.
A model conceived in these terms, on the other hand, 
has merit per se and not merely as a restricted version of a 
broader approach. One does not need to be reminded that the 
goal of foreign aid is to promote development in LDCs, in 
general, but to do so in all LDCs. If growth in general were 
the goal, then aid would mostly flow to those LDCs which
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already - or were close to - have fulfilled the "pre-condi­
tions" for growth, thus accentuating what Isenman (1975,
1976) has identified as the "middle-income bias" in aid al­
location. LDCs below this stage would then be condemned to 
lag behind the rest of the world for a considerable period 
of time, if not forever.
To make the case in favor of poorer LDCs one has to 
argue what in their conditions differentiate them from the 
rest of the countries. Whatever the origin of those dif­
ferences (historical, lack of purpose in the past, having 
become independent states very recently), the case can be 
made on the basis of the existence of "weak linkages" between 
these countries and the world economy. Linkages of lesser 
developed LDCs tend to be weaker than those of higher devel­
oped countries because of the nature of their economic struc­
ture;, not diversified, and foreign trade characterized by the 
export of very few primary products and very diversified 
imports. The case is most serious when exports are concen­
trated in extractive activities where production assumes the 
form of "enclave," and the linkages with the rest of the 
internal economy are virtually absent. But even when exports 
are concentrated in few agricultural commodities, if land 
ownership is concentrated (as generally is), the linkages
O
with the internal economy are also very weak. Then, the 
most dynamic sector of the economy, which derives its growth 
from the expansion of the world economy, does not transmit 
its dynamism to the internal economy. Consequently, growth 
in DCs and higher developed LDCs does not necessarily induce
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growth in LDCs. Finally, the case can also rest on the fact 
that more emphasis will have to be put on enabling the poorer 
LDCs to reach the threshold of development.
Past models of aid allocation have in different ways 
attempted to incorporate poverty (or equity) considerations 
into the analysis. Donor countries, practitioners and the 
"development community" have since long recognized the 
necessity for addressing the inter-country distributional 
effects of aid-induced growth. But the actual inclusion of 
poverty variables has been done on strictly a priori grounds, 
and as a result of that, as one variable between many others 
considered. It is only by framing the analysis in a Theory 
of Growth and Distribution - as I do here by adopting the 
approach proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) - that 
growth and distribution effects of aid can be adequately 
weighted.
II. The Model
The first step in the construction of the model is 
to specify a world social welfare function a la Ahluwalia 
and Chenery (1974) where the unit of analysis is the country. 
Each country's welfare is weighted according to some cri­
teria in order to conform the overall welfare function. Two 
alternatives appear here: one is to use "equal weights," and
the other, "poverty weights." To follow on "equal weights" 
approach means that each country's welfare is weighted by 
its population share in overall population of countries being
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considered, which implies that world social welfare increases 
are the population weighted increases of each country's wel­
fare. Another way of understanding this is to realize that 
a country's welfare contribution to world social welfare will 
be larger the larger its population (or, what is the same, , 
the larger the number of people who enjoy those welfare in­
creases) , and vice versa.
"Poverty weights," on the other hand, attach greater 
importance to the welfare of poorer countries, such that the 
contribution of welfare increases in poorer countries to 
world social welfare would be more than proportional to the 
relative number of people enjoying it. In other words, 
"poverty weights" would assign greater impact on world so­
cial welfare to the welfare gains of poorer countries. These 
weights would result from explicit social preferences (in our 
case, world social preferences, or donor countries' social 
preferences) as to what is the "desirable" inter-country dis­
tributional impact of aid-induced growth. Given that I do 
not have any basis to justify the selection of any of those 
weights, any development along these lines would necessarily 
be arbitrary.
It is evident that there are no ways of establishing 
these "social preferences"; and therefore there is no way of 
objectively specifying "poverty weights." Moreover, even if 
I were to justify the former, I would still prefer to ap­
proach the subject from the standpoint of simple equity 
(say, "one man, one vote . . ."); that is why I have decided 
to follow an "equal weights" approach, or population weights.
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I define a multiplicative world social welfare 
function:
m
w = T T  (Yi)ni/N (3.1)
i=l
W: social welfare function, symmetric in per
capita income, strictly quasi-concave in
income.^
: level of income in country i.
ni : population of country i.
N: population of all countries considered.
Since a country's welfare is weighted here by its 
population share, the level of income is taken as index for 
welfare. A more appropriate index for welfare in the long 
run would be consumption level, but doing so would require 
consideration of savings and investment levels (i.e., con­
sidering consumption level alone would penalize countries 
which have high savings rates, and particularly those which 
have higher marginal than average savings rates), so as to 
include indigenous efforts and prospects for growth and, 
therefore, prospects for increasing consumption in the long 
run. The index chosen can thus be defended on the grounds 
that the purpose of the model is to analyze aid-induced 
welfare in a given moment in time.
A second step, necessary to transform world social 
welfare function (3.1) from a definitional relationship, a
welfare measure, into a behavioral equation, is to define 
the level of income in terms of a production function, where 
aid enters as another factor of production.
Then, I represent the level of output Yi as a func­
tion of the level of inputs, technological and institutional 
factors:
A^ :' stock of foreign aid
Ki:; stock of capital, excluding foreign aid 
: labor force
Ri : other productive resources
Assuming now that the level of inputs other than
foreign aid remains constant at the existing level at the 
moment of performing the analysis permits us to determine 
the impact that additional flows of aid would have both on 




  = FI > 0  positive MPP of aid and, (3.4)
<5 Ai x
A^ < 0 decreasing MPP of aid (3.5)
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Total differentiation of (3.3) yields:
dYi = FAi ' dKi = dLi = dRi = 0 (3.6)
dY^: income increases due to aid.
The advantages of specifying a production function 
in this manner is apparent. In the first place, I do not 
assume fixed coefficients, so that substitutibility between 
productive factors is permitted; and, what is more important 
for my purposes, the productivity of aid is not constant 
(as assumed by Edelman and Chenery, 1977). Secondly, estima­
tions of the productivity of aid (or a close proxy) would be 
a direct measure of the growth impact of aid, which one 
would expect to be different from the productivity of other 
forms of capital in the economy. This is another advantage 
over the methodology followed by Edelman and Chenery (1977), 
since they assumed the productivity of aid equal to the in­
cremental output-capital ratio. Third, since the produc­
tivity of aid would be obtained from (3.3), it would depend 
not just on the level of aid but also on the institutional 
and technical parameters of the function and the levels and 
productivities of the other factors of production. There­
fore, the estimate of the productivity of foreign aid would 
be a measure of the overall growth performance of each 
country as applied to the productive factor we are interested 
in. And fourth, the estimate of the productivity of foreign 
aid would be on the basis of historical data. As such, it
would be a measure of past overall economic performance of 
aid. In order to be able to use these estimates in the al­
location of aid, where we are interested in the impacts of 
different aid levels on the world social welfare of LDCs, 
we only require that the productive functions from where 
they are derived be stable for the period under consideration.
which is the social welfare function I will use below. 
Total differentiation of (3.7) yields:
i=l
Strict quasi-concavity of (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5) 
ensure the convexity to the origin of (3.8).
Substituting (3.3) and (3.6) into (3.8), and 
dividing by W yields:
Edelman and Chenery (1977). The differences between this 
specification and specification (3.8) have been discussed 
above. In practical terms, specification (3.9) involves











which is the measure of welfare increases due to aid used in
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"corner solutions,"3 so that welfare increases would be 
maximized when all aid is given to the country with the 
highest productivity to per capita income ratio. Specifica­
tion (3.8), on the other hand, always involves giving some 
aid to all countries (more on this later).
In order to harmonize the maximization of world 
social welfare and the availability of aid (as well as to 
ensure the exhaustion of the aid when the allocation process 
is over), I define a constraint in the form of the available 
pool of aid: 
m
Y  Ai = F (3-10)
i=l
F:: available pool of aid
Using (3.10) and (3.7) we form the following La 
Grange function: 
m
V "  f W n m 
w* = ) Fi(Ai) - X( I Ai - F) (3.11)
i=l 1
Function w* is maximized, which yields:
= W ^  ^ i  - A = 0  
6Ai N Fi (Ai)
S w *  = 
<5A = F ( 3 . 1 2 )
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The necessary conditions for a maximum implies that: 
ni•FAi
X =   for all i (3.13)
Fi(Ai)
Expression (3.13) tells us that world social welfare 
will be maximized when the ratio of the productivity of aid 
to per capita income is equal for all countries. Another way 
of understanding this is that for social welfare to be maxi­
mized, then the world social welfare contributions of aid to 
each country must be equal at the margin.
It should also be observed that the marginal contribu­
tion to social welfare of aid to a country is directly pro­
portional to the productivity of aid in that country and 
indirectly proportional to its per capita income level (in­
cluding changes due to aid). As mentioned before, the way 
the productivity of aid is estimated makes it a measure of 
overall economic performance. Per capita income can be con­
sidered as an index of need or level of poverty. Then, 
expression (3.13) establishes that the contribution to world 
social welfare of aid granted to a country is directly pro­
portional to economic performance and to need. Then, a norm 
for aid allocation would be to relate the level of aid to a 
country directly to aid performance and inversely to per 
capita income. This does not imply, however, that all aid 
will be given to the country with the highest performance 
cum need; for the larger the aid to a country, the lower its 
index will be. In fact, what it tells us is that if each
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additional unit of aid were given to the country with the 
highest aid performance to per capita income ratio, in the 
end that ratio would be equal for all countries.
Three important points should be made here. • First, 
this norm for aid allocation is consistent with those proposed 
in the literature with the difference that this one is sys­
tematically derived from our model whereas the norms pre­
viously used were given a priori. A second point is that the 
relationship established between performance and need is con­
tinuous, so that if a country has good performance it would 
still be granted aid even if its per capita income level is 
high. This proposition is more reasonable than establishing 
a cut-off per capita income level above which no aid at all 
would be g r a n t e d .  ^ And third, given the existing differences 
in per capita income level between LDCs and the relatively 
low level of available aid, then application of this norm 
can be expected to result in more aid toward poorer countries 
with good performance and less to richer low performance 
countries. In general, then, the time path of aid to a 
country as it grows (gets into higher per capita income levels) 
would be negatively sloped and continuous, if the increases 
in the available pool of aid are not large enough to offset 
the trend resulting from decreasing productivity of aid and 
larger per capita income.
To determine the aid allocation that would result 
from equations(3.12) we need to introduce a transformation, 
since the levels of income and the productivity of aid are
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implicit functions of the level of aid. For this purpose,
I use the elasticity of output with respect to aid, which is 
assumed to be independent from the level of aid.^
So, I define:
FV  A
«i = - — 7 • i O - 1*)1 Fi(Ai)




Substituting (3.15) into equation (3.12), and solving for Ai:
Ajl - F nl’al (3.16)
Eni•ai
Rearranging the above equation, we obtain 
Ai = F & )  • ( ai n (3.17)N ' \ n i
Z !T‘ai
which indicates that aid granted to a country should be a pro­
portion of the total pool of aid (F). That factor of propor­
tionality is the resultant of ttoo forces: first, a strict
proportion according to population shares, which would be the 
case if aid were allocated on the basis of equity principles 
alone; and second, this resulting allocation according to the
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equity principles further adjusted by a performance index, 
measured by the ratio of the performance of each country to 
the population weighted average performance for all countries. 
If a country's performance were higher than the average, then 
it would receive a larger proportion of the aid pool than the 
share of its population in total population (and vice versa).
Summing up, we have gotten an allocation index in the 
form of two multipliers: one, population shares; and two, a
performance multiplier that adjusts upward or downward the 
population share multiplier. This allocation index has been 
indirectly derived from the maximization of a social welfare 
function constrained by the availability of aid. The con­
tributions to world social welfare of aid to each country are 
directly proportional to the productivity of aid and need 
(or poverty, as measured by per capita income level). The 
derivation of the allocation index ensures that the proposed 
aid allocation is consistent with aid availability and that 
available aid is exhausted. Finally, the performance vari­
able, productivity of aid, which is a function of the levels 
of aid, and the levels and productivities of all other 
productive factors, is susceptible to empirical estimation.
The need variable is either observable or computable on the 
basis of the estimated production function. Consequently, 
both indexes and their direction of association with aid are 
derived from the model. Moreover, since its computation is 
based on a production function estimated from historical 
data, they also qualify as "objective" variables accountable 
for the levels of world social welfare (as defined here).^
Ill. Illustration of the Working of the Model
Two illustrations will be presented. One is the ap­
plication of this model to the example proposed by Edelman 
and Chenery (1977), assuming, as they do, that the incre­
mental output capital ratio is representative of the produc­
tivity of aid. The second illustration is an hypothetical 
example for two countries whose production functions and 
factor endowments are assumed known. The results show that 
when this system of allocation is applied, the social welfare 
of these countries is maximized. And indeed, the condition 
for welfare maximization, that the ratio of aid productivity 
to per capita income be the same for both countries, is ful­
filled.
Illustration 1: The allocation proposed by this model
gives more aid to the group of poorer countries than that 
proposed by Edelman and Chenery. Despite the fact that IOCR 
(assumed to approximate the productivity of aid) of richer 
countries is larger than taht of poorer countries, because 
their per capita income is five times larger, their per­
formance multiplier reduces their population multiplier to 
less than one third to produce the allocation index.
The welfare measure (3.9) is larger for the aid al­
location proposed by this model (5.28 percent) than for the 
allocation proposed by Edelman and Chenery (3.93 percent).
But not all aid would be granted to poorer countries because 
here I have made the more reasonable assumption that
Illustration 1: Two groups of countries in Edelman and Chenery (1977, p. 46)
Poorer Countries Richer Countries Total
Income Level (Y^)(b. dollars)
Population (ni)
Population Share (ni/N)
Per Capita Income (y^)(U$)
I COR
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productivity decreases in each group of countries as higher 
levels of aid are received.^
Illustration 2 : Hypothetical example for two countries.
Assume the universe is composed of two countries 
whose production functions, factor endowments and population 
are known:
Qq = 15 A-33 Q2 = 20 B-45
riq = 2 5  n£ = 75
Qq,Q2: output level, a function of aid
levels. Other productive factors 
known and constant, 
n p  n2 : population of the country.
A, B: aid levels to each country.
World social welfare function (3.7) would then be:
W = (15 A-33)-25 • (20 B-45)-75
Suppose now that the pool of aid is known and equal 
to 240, such that the aid availability constraint (3.10) is:
F = 240 = A + B
Use of the allocation index (3.17) yields:
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Country
Variable 1 2  3
Aid A ± 47.1 192.9 240
Output Qi 53.5 213.5
MPPAi .3745 .4988
Per Capita Income 2.14 2.85
A= FI /P.C.I. (3.13) .17500 .17500
i
Allocation Index .196 .804
Population Multiplier .25 .75
Performance Multiplier .784 1.072
Welfare 151.05
Any other aid profile would yield a lower word social 
welfare. Maximization of world welfare would be consistent 
with the existence of countries with different per capita 
income, for this one not only depends on aid levels but also 
on factor endowments, factor productivities, technological 
and institutional peculiarities of each country. But at the 
maximum world welfare, the ratio of the marginal productivity 
of aid to per capita income is equal in both countries 
(F^/PCI) . That is to say, world welfare is maximized when 
the distribution of aid is such that an additional unit of 
aid to any country yields the same increases in total world 
welfare.
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FOOTNOTES FROM CHAPTER THREE
^This idea is implicit in Ahluwalia and Chenery 
(1974) and'phrased in a different way by Isenman (1975, 
p. 4; 1976, p. 638). Indeed, there is no reason for this 
principle not to be extended to include poverty groups in 
DCs, what would certainly have profound repercussions.
^Which seems to be the basis for Adelman and 
Morris' (1968) approach.
^The argument is: richer segments of the population,
deriving their income from the export sector, tend to have 
similar patterns of consumption to those prevailing in richer 
countries. Therefore, instead of using their increased rich­
ness for savings and investment within the economy, they 
demand consumption goods only obtainable through imports.
It results then that the only groups of the population able 
to save, have high propensity to consume, and their consump­
tion can only be satisfied through imports. Diversified im­
port activities develop, but these have weak linkages, inhibit 
the development of indigenous industrial activities, and 
finally, only expand the service sector of the economy. See 
Chapter Two, Section I, and UN-ECLA Reports.
^See Layard and Walters (1978), pp. 42-51.
^This was discussed in the review of Edelman and 
Chenery (1977), in Chapter Two, Section III.
6 This is one of the premises of the model proposed by 
Cline and Sargen (1975), which is accepted by Isenman. (1976).
7 This assumption would only hold for Cobb-Douglas 
type production functions. Though this is a restrictive 
assumption, I take the stand that in any event it is more 
reasonable to assume the elasticity to be constant, than 
to assume the productivity of aid is constant.
®These points are related to the discussion of 
Chapter Two, Section V, and to Cline and Sargen's a priori 
statement about the desirable properties an allocation system 
should fulfill.
^Due to lack of knowledge about the elasticity of 
output with respect to aid for these groups of countries, 




N Z T <FAi/Yi>
^Welfare measure (3.9) was used for this computation.
1 1Overall productivity of resources can be expected 
to increase as a country develops (at least up to a certain 
degree of development). But it is still reasonable to believe 
that there will be diminishing returns.
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
I. Introduction
This chapter consists of an empirical application of 
the model developed in Chapter Three, to different categories 
of aid for different subperiods between 1965 and 1973. The 
aim is to determine the allocation of aid which would have 
resulted if the premises adopted here had been followed. The 
aid allocation proposed by the mo del'is then contrasted with 
actual aid (commitments or actual), and a discussion of the 
differences serves to highlight the potential for reallocation.
The work is divided into two parts: one, estimation 
of the productivity of aid, so as to obtain the required mea­
sure of aid performance; and two, computation of the aid al­
location that results from the application of the model.
Two approaches to the estimation of the productivity 
of aid were attempted: One, a supply approach, based on a
production function which is manipulated so as to avoid the 
need for estimates of the stock of capital. This approach 
follows the procedure of T. P. Hill (1964), P. Armstrong and 
J. Lambelet (1970) and S. K. Singh (1975). Two, a demand 
approach, based on the assumption that exogenous demand 
variables are determinants of the long-run rate of growth 
in income. Here I followed the approach of M. Ghali (1973, 
1976), and E. Thorbecke and A. Condos (1966), in applied.
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studies, and J. Cornwall (1970) in the theoretical dis­
cussion.
The estimation of the productivity of aid employing 
both these supply and demand approaches is based on a regres 
sion over a sample of 60 LDCs. Theory tells us that there 
exists one significant relationship between explanatory 
variables (either supply or demand variables) and the rate 
of growth in output (income) capable of representing the 
phenomenon of growth in a systematic way and with relatively 
high accuracy. But because our sample consists of a cross 
section of countries, most institutional and economic struc­
ture parameters cannot be expected to be captured by the 
general relationship. Differences exist between our coun­
tries in terms of degree of development, role and share of 
the government in the economic activity, size (which would 
permit taking advantage of economies of scale), openness of 
the economy (which influences domestic possibilities of 
profitable investment in industry and other sectors), and 
differences in the efficiency of markets, which affect the 
process of resource allocation. Lack of their consideration 
would substantially reduce the explanatory power of the over 
all relationship between growth in output and explanatory 
variables, and particularly the accuracy of the estimates of 
aid productivity.
Growth and development theories also provide us with 
hypotheses about the way factor productivities or contribu­
tions to growth are affected by institutional and economic
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structure parameters. It is necessary, then, to "model" the 
function so as to explicitly include in the analysis the 
type of parameters discussed above. It both serves the 
purpose of capturing relevant aspects of the phenomenon under 
consideration, therefore increasing explanatory power, and 
finally, it permits the determination of different estimates 
of aid productivity for each country.
We cannot expect the estimates of aid performance 
derived from the supply approach to be identical to those 
obtained from the demand approach. In the first case we 
would obtain estimates of the marginal productivity of aid, 
while in the second we would obtain the contribution of 
aid to growth, or the marginal change in income due to a 
marginal change in aid (this is explained in Section II).
The reason, therefore, for attempting two approaches has 
been a pragmatic one: to be able to choose which approach
yields better estimates. On the other hand, so long as the 
estimates obtained by any of these two approaches approxi­
mates well the relative differences in the productivity of 
aid between countries, it should be inconsequential whether
O
one or the other approach is finally chosen.
Once the estimates of aid performance have been ob­
tained, the computation of proposed aid to each country is 
done consistently with the model: aid performance, poverty
(as measured by per capita income) and population shares are 
the three variables considered. One word of caution is 
necessary, however. Given that we are not able to determine
the production functions for each country,3 we will not be 
able to incorporate the effect of different aid levels on 
income levels and marginal productivities of aid. Therefore, 
the allocation index used here will consider aid performance 
and per capita income levels as constants, what points to 
one of the limitations in the empirical application of the 
model. Notwithstanding, the allocation index used here 
will still be composed of two multipliers: one, population
shares, which yields the allocation that would result if 
aid were strictly distributed according to egalitarian 
principles; and two, a performance multiplier, which con­
sists of the ratio of aid productivity to per capita in­
come in each country, relative to the population weighted 
average of that ratio for all countries. Such approximation 
is consistent with the theoretical allocation index developed 
in Chapter Three, and can be interpreted to yield that aid 
allocation which would maximize welfare increases due to aid.
The selection of the countries to be included in the 
sample, as well as the sample size, were mostly a function 
of data availability. The aim was to use the largest pos­
sible sample of countries for which data on the relevant 
explanatory variables of growth in income, and aid, were 
available. Our sources of data on general economic vari­
ables was the World Bank's "World Tables 1976." For data 
on aid, two sources were used: aid commitments for three
periods were available from the sample used by Edelman and 
Chenery (1977),^ for the annual averages of the periods
1967-1969, 1970-1972, and 1973-1974; and data on actual Net 
Official Flows (NOF) were available from the OECD Reviews 
for all countries from 1969 on.^ From these sources, all 
countries were drawn which fulfilled the following require­
ments: one, full data availability for the variables neces­
sary to estimate the performance of aid; and two, were in­
cluded in the sample used by Edelman and Chenery. A special 
effort was made to ensure a proportional number of countries 
from each per capita income group. This was accomplished 
for all groups, except for the group of poorest countries: 
many of the poorest countries either had no reliable data or 
no data at all.
All in all, the 60 countries selected for my sample 
account for about 75 percent of all aid provided by DAC 
donors, includes the great majority of countries included in 
the samples of Strout and Clark (1969) and Isemman (1976) 
as well as that of Singh (1975) with the exception of the 
DCs included there. Therefore, the generality of the results 
obtained here can be defended on the grounds of the coverage 
of the aid allocated to the countries included in this sample 
and by the inclusion of the majority of LDCs with sufficient 
data.
In estimating the performance of aid, the annual 
average value and the trend growth rates of the variables 
for the period 1965-1973 were used. The justification for 
this is the assumption that by considering a sufficiently 
long period of time, the risks of yearly abnormalities is
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"evened" out, and the lags between investment and output are 
less crucial.
For the computations of proposed aid allocation, 
aid as commitments and aid in actual NOF was considered. 
Commitments of aid were included because it has been argued 
that they reflect better the intentions of donors' aid 
agencies, while actual figures result from the interaction 
of those intentions with the political considerations in­
volved in the process of aid allocation.
Aid commitment figures were considered in nominal 
real terms and in grant equivalent terms. This latter con­
sists of a normalization of nominal values according to the 
terms and grant component of the flows of aid: it is con­
tended that given the different terms of different flows of 
aid, its nominal addition is inadequate (like adding pears 
and apples); also it is contended that the terms at which 
aid is granted is another factor contemplated in the alloca­
tion of aid.^
NOF for the annual average of the period 1969-1973 
were included so as to contemplate in the analysis actual, 
as opposed to commitment, figures. Since NOF figures are 
flows of aid net of repayments of principal and interest, it 
serves better for the purpose of analyzing the net effect of 
the flows of aid on each country. A comparison of these 
figures with those of commitments is usually made to discuss 
the effect of non technical factors in the process of aid 
allocation.
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Both commitments of aid and NOF are broken down into 
multilateral and bilaterial. It is often contended that 
Multilaterial Aid Agencies are more insulated from short-run 
political considerations, so that their actions can be ex­
pected to be more technico-economic oriented.^ Disaggregating 
aid in this manner serves the purpose of checking whether 
there exists differences in the deviations between actual 
(commitments and NOF) aid and that proposed by this model 
for both types of aid.
A final aspect to be pointed out here is that a proxy 
had to be used in .the estimation of aid performance. Two 
reasons justify this decision: one, our estimation of aid
performance was done for the period 1965-1973, and no aid 
data was available for a number of countries in the sample 
prior to 1969; and two, the actual amounts of aid in other 
cases were extremely low. For these reasons, foreign capital 
inflows were used instead. And I further hypothesize that 
these can be expected to represent better the overall con­
tribution that aid would have on growth and world social 
welfare, as defined in Chapter Three. Foreign capital in­
flows were measured as the difference between imports and 
exports, an approximation frequently performed in the litera­
ture, and an acceptable assumption when dealing with averages 
for periods of time of lengths as the one I have used here.
II. Estimation of the Productivity of Foreign Capital Inflows
Two approaches for the estimation of the productivity 
of foreign capital inflows were followed along the lines
92
discussed in the preceding section: a supply approach and
a demand approach. This section is organized in four parts: 
first, a presentation of the supply approach and the results 
of estimation; second, presentation of the demand approach 
and the results of estimation; third, discussion of the 
reasons why the demand approach is preferred; and fourth, 
the estimation of the contribution of foreign investment to 
growth according to the demand approach.
Q
1. Supply Approach
Following Singh (1975) , I postulate a production
function:
Q = F(K, L, t) (4.1)




Capital is disaggregated in two components: domestic
capital (Kp) and foreign capital (KF). This yields:
Q = F(KD , Kf , L, t) (4.2)
Time is introduced in the production function to in­
corporate the shifts due to technological changes. On the
Q
other hand, I do not include imports as Singh does, because
my measures of foreign capital inflows already includes im­
ports as one of the determinants.
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Since I deal with cross-section behavior, the time 
term is ignored. Differentiating (4.2) totally, and dividing 
by Q, we get:
dQ 1 _ it dKD 1 i -pi ,1 , „ dL 1 // o\
dt - Q kD' at * Q KF dt Q + FL'dt'Q  ^ ^
dKD dKD
Now: I =   + rDKD ;   = I - rDKD (4.4)
dt dt
F - ^ + rFKF; - rDKD (4.5)
I:; gross domestic investment 
F: gross foreign investment
rD ,rF : domestic and fdreign capital
depreciation rates.
Substitution of (4.4) and (4.5) in (4.3) yields:
a? 5  -  b + FKB^  + fkf  ■ w -6)
R- KF
where b = - r ^ .  —  - r ^ .  —
dL/dt 1/L: growth rate of the labor force.
Equation (4.3) explains the growth rate in output as 
a function of the marginal productivities of factors and the 
increments in their stocks as a proportion to GDP. Equation 
(4.6) is the same as equation (4.3), only that the growth rate 
in output is explained by the productivities of domestic and
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foreign capitals and their investment-output ratios, and the
partial elasticity of output with respect to labor times the
growth rate of the labor force.
Equation (4.6) can then be estimated
P = aQ + & 1 DIS + a2 FIS + a3 Y • RN (4.7)
where aQ = a + b
a: growth rate of GDP due to productive factors
not included.
P: growth rate of GDP.
DIS: domestic investment share in GDP.
FIS: foreign investment share in GDP.
Y: per capita income.
RN: population growth rate.
To estimate equation (4.7) I have made the assumption
that the labor participation rates across the countries in
the sample are identical,^  which permits the use of per
capita income as an approximation for the output-labor ratio,
and the use of the population growth rate instead of the growth
rate of the labor force.
The estimated parameters a-^ , a3 and a3 would yield
the marginal productivities of inputs, and aQ represents the
1 9autonomous growth rate in output. ^
The results of the regression on equation (4.7) are 
reported in Table 1, Equation 1.
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T A B L E  1 : SUPPLY APPROACH
EQUATION 1
P = .029 + .131 DIS + .140 FIS + .609E-3 Y.RN
(2.84) (2.41), (1.97)
R2 : .257 R2 : .217 SE: .020388
F ( 3,56): 6.441 RSS: .023276
EQUATION 2




- .946 FIS + .020 Yl.FIS + .152 LN.FIS
(-2.42) (.42) (2.08)
+ 2.33 MS.FIS 
(2.78)
- 34.4 RN/Y + .067 Yl.RN
(-.81) (.81)
R2 : .404 R2 : .282 SE: .01952
F (10,49): 3.318 RSS: .01867
EQUATION 3
P = .039 + .119 DIS + .330E-3 Y.DIS - .273E-6 Y4.DIS
(.51) (1.45) (-1.61)
- .609E-3 LN.DIS - .184 MS.DIS
(-.03) (-.75)
- 1.54 FIS - .441E-3 Y.FIS + .210E-6 Y4.FIS
(-2.58) (-.93) (.94)
+ .132 LN.FIS + 2.51 MS.FIS
(1.98) (3.23)
R2 : .412 R2 : .292 SE: .01939
F (10,49): 3.432 , RSS: .01841
Since I am dealing with observations across country, 
a number of factors can be expected to explain the differ­
ences in marginal productivities from one country to another. 
As the marginal productivities are not directly observable, 
a priori modeling of their shapes is necessary. Singh (1975) 
provides us with a series of hypotheses to model the marginal 
productivities of capital and labor. The marginal produc­
tivity of capital is hypothesized to be a function of the 
capital-labor ratio, the size of the market (which permits 
economies of scale), the availability of imports, the share 
of public investment in total investment, and the existence 
of price disequilibrium. The marginal productivity of labor 
is hypothesized to be exclusively a function of the capital- 
labor ratio. Of these, I only considered the hypotheses of 
the influence of the capital-labor ratio, the size of the 
market and the availability of imports.^
The marginal productivities of both domestic and 
foreign capital (which are assumed to be subjected to the 
same influences) are modeled as follows. To begin with, it
can be shown the equivalence of the capital-labor ratio and
the output-labor ratio as determinants of the profile of the 
marginal productivities of capital and labor. ^  If one con­
siders exclusively the decreasing portion of the marginal pro 
ductivity of capital as the output-labor ratio increases, we 
get the following basic profiles:
%  = a10 “ all (Q/L)C1 (4.8)
Fr f = a20 - a21 (Q/L)Cl (4.9)
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where a-^ Q and a2Q describe the average = marginal produc­
tivity corresponding to a fixed coefficients production func­
tion, and a ^  and a2  ^ (with an expected positive sign), the 
negative effect of increases in the capital intensity in the 
economy. The parameter C]_, which is a measure of substi­
tutability between capital and labor, has to be obtained by
simulation of that value which yields best fit. Three
values for this parameter were simulated (.25, .50 and .75), 
and .25 was finally preferred.
The size of the market enters as a "shift" factor for 
the basic profile, in logs form, trying either output or 
population as a proxy (population was preferred), and with an 
expected positive sign. The hypothesis about the effect of 
the variability of imports is justified along the lines of 
two-gap models, where imports enters as a critical input in 
production the lack of which could impede growth (or its ac­
celeration) . It also operates as a shift factor for the basic
profile, with an expected positive sign. The functions of 
the marginal productivities of domestic and foreign capital 
become, then:
FKD = a10 " all (Q/L)Cl + a12 <loS N> + a13 MS (4.10)
FKF = a20 " a21 (Q/DCl + a22 (log N) + a23 MS (4.11)
Q/L ~ Y:- per capita income 
N: population
MS: imports share in GDP
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For the marginal productivity of labor the only
hypothesis advanced is that it increases from negative to
1 fihigher values as per capita income increases:
Fl = a30 + a31 (Q/L)C4 (4.12)
Multiplying by L/Q, as in specification^. 6) , we
get,
FL*L/Q = a30 (L/Q) + a31 (Q/L)C4_1 (4.13)
where has to be simulated again (C^ = 1.25 was preferred).
The whole equation to be estimated now is:
P = a0 + (a10 - alx YC1 + ai2 l°g N + a^3 MS) DIS
+ (^20 “ a21 a22 1°S ^ a23
+ (a30 * Y-1 + a3i Yc4“1) RN (4.14)
The results are reported in Table 1, Equation 2. 
Though there is a gain in explanatory power as compared to 
specification (4.7), only three of the coefficients are 
significant at a 5 percent level, and one of these (a2(p ^as 
the wrong sign. None of the coefficients for domestic 
capital or labor proved significant.
Yet, a further modification was attempted, intro­
ducing a quadratic specification for domestic and foreign 
capital relationships to capital intensity. The idea here 
was to allow for an increasing segment for the marginal 
productivities - as capital intensity increased from low
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levels up to a maximum, and then a decreasing section. In­
troducing these changes, the specifications of the marginal 
productivity of domestic and foreign capital take the form:
FK^ = a10 + (ail Y “ all y2)+ a12 loS N + a13 MS (4.10') 
fKF = a20 + (a21 Y “ a2i y2)+ a22 loS N + a23 MS (4.11')
Here I excluded labor from the equation.^ Results 
are reported as Equation 3 in Table 1. Some improvements was 
attained for some of the coefficients (in terms of higher t 
values and correctness of signs), but the only coefficient 
significant at the 5 percent level ( ^ q) > again had the wrong 
sign. Evidently, these results are very far from being useful 
for any purpose other than to show that efforts were made in 
this direction.
Finally, the reasons why these results are so poor 
compared to those obtained by Singh can be found in the fol­
lowing factors: first, differences in the specification of
the production function, since Singh includes imports, which 
I do not; and I disaggregate capital into domestic and for­
eign, which he does not. Second, in modeling the productivi­
ties I was not able to consider public investment shares and 
price disequilibriums, for the reasons mentioned above.
Third, my sample consists exclusively of LDCs, while his 
sample of 70 countries included 21 DCs (including all DAC 
countries); and finally, he used geometric growth rates, 
while I used trend growth rates.
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2. Demand Approach
The central issue in formulating a demand approach
for the explanation of growth is:
. . . Can changes in aggregate demand and 
its growth rate caused by changes in the 
marginal propensity to invest or any 
other spending parameter affect the long­
term growth rate?18
The most important consideration is whether the 
economy has unemployed resources, for if ". . . the economy 
operates below capacity, aggregate demand alone determines 
levels of income. We can assume that to be the case in
most if not all LDCs. But even if that were only partially 
the case, Cornwall develops the case for the conditions under 
which demand matters generally:
. . . If it is to be argued that demand at
least partially determines the long run 
growth rate . . . .  this is essentially a 
matter of higher rates of growth of demand 
inducing equal or greater increases in the 
rates of growth of maximum output.20
The crux of his argument is that "the process of
growth is anything but balanced."21 This can be viewed, he
contends, as a movement through a hierarchy of goods: goods
considered luxuries in the past become necessities in the
present, and new luxury goods are created. With different
elasticities of demand, the higher the rate of growth of
demand the more rapidly the composition of demand will
change. How rapidly the changing composition of demand
results in a changing composition of output depends on the
levels and rates of growth of productivity in different
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sectors of the economy, and the rate of transfer of resources. 
But both the behavior of productivity and the rate of transfer 
of resources themselves depend on the rate of growth of 
demand. Productivity will rise because the fear of excess 
capacity, associated with higher technologies which involve 
indivisibilities, will be smaller if demand is growing rapidly. 
Higher technologies will permit exploiting economies of scale 
in production.
The rate of transfer of resources will also depend 
on how rapidly demand expands, provided the transfer is from 
sectors with below average, to sectors with above average 
productivity: demand will increase faster for those sectors
where prices are decreasing relative to the general price 
level, because of gains in productivity. The transfer of 
resources will also depend on the willingness of (organized) 
labor to permit changes in plant layout and the type of 
capital installed. Ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of 
growth of demand, the lower the rate of unemployment will 
be, thus decreasing the reluctance of labor to accept in­
novations. Finally, the growth of demand will also affect 
labor participation rates and migration into the country.
It is clear that so long as unemployment is stable or de­
creasing, according to the rate of growth of demand, the 
larger will be the impact upon these factors.
The influence of Cornwall's argument in the modeling 
of the contribution of investment to growth will be apparent 
when the corresponding hypotheses are proposed.
The presentation of the demand model proceeds as 
follows. Consider first the income identity:
Q: GDP, gross domestic product
C:: private consumption
G: government consumption
I : GDI, gross domestic investment
X: exports
M: . imports
If we accept that private and government consumption 
are a function of income, and imports a function either of 
income, consumption or investment, then we have:
where income is viewed as a function of exogenous demand
Now, I disaggregate gross domestic investment (GDI) 
into its components: domestic investment, foreign investment,
and net factor income. We get:
Q = C + G + I + X -  M ( 4 . 1 5 )
Q = F(I, X) (4.16)
variables.^2
Q = F(Id , If , Inf, X) (4.17)
Ip: domestic investment
Ip: foreign investment
I^p: net factor income
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The rate of change in income would then be a function 
of the rates of change in domestic and foreign invesment, 
net factor income, and exports:
d£ = H d l m ’ (4.18)
3t \ dt dt dt dt)
This function is assumed to be linear,23 such that 
dividing by Q:
dQ 1 dID 1 , dlF 1 , a dX 1n = an + ai — -  — +  a n -------+ a o -----
dt Q 0 dt Q dt Q dt Q
+ a4 1 (4.19)
dt Q
which after manipulation becomes:
32 1 = a + a i + a “ f i If
^  Q 0 1 dt ID Q 2 dt Ip Q
+ a3 - h -  + ao (4.20)
dt X Q J dt INF Q









= FI: growth rate of foreign investment
= FIS: foreign investment share in GDP
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X/Q = XS: exports share in GDP
dljjp 1
-------- = NFI: growth rate of net factor income
dt Ijflp
In f /Q = NFI: net factor income share in GDP
Equation (4.20) states that the growth rate in in­
come is a function of the weighted growth rates of exogenous 
demand variables. The weights are given by the share of each 
variable in gross domestic product. In what follows, the 
product of the growth rates times the share in GDP will be 
the notation used in implementing empirically the model:
P = dQ/dt 1/Q 
DD = DI • DIS
FF = FI • FIS
XX = X • XS
NF = NFI • NFIS
Then, equation (4.20) becomes:
P = aQ + ax DD + a2 FF + a3 XX + a4 NF (4.20')
The results of regressing (4.201) are reported in 
Table 2, Equation 1. These results are relatively good, since 
all estimated coefficients are significant at higher levels 
than 1 percent, and the results are consistent with theoretical 
expectations (i.e., the explanatory variables are positively 
related to growth in income). The overall explanatory power 
is high (corrected of .70), but the standard error of the
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T A B L E  2 : DEMAND APPROACH
EQUATION 1
P = .033 + 1.08 DD + .889 FF + .537 XX + 1.93 NF
(6.36) (4.22) (3,13) (4.17)
R2 : .716 R2 : .695 SE: .01272
F ( 4,55): 34.612 RSS:: .0089
EQUATION 2




YL-.DD - 2.78 MS.DD 
(-2.30)
+ 1.45 FF 
(2.73)
+ . 173E-1 
(3.26)
YL.FF - 4.93 MS.FF 
(-2.45)
+ 1.04 XX 
(5.48)
- 2.01 I. 
(-2.76)
XX





R2 : .843 R2 : .811 SE: .0100
F (10,49): 26.334 RSS:; .0049
EQUATION 3




YL.DD - 2.87 MS.DD 
(-2.56)
+ 1.54 FF 
(3.14)
+ . 139E-1 
(2.77)
YL.FF - 4.36 MS.FF 
(-2.33)
+ 1.01 XX 
(5.79)
- 2.00 I.XX 
(-2.98)





- .030 SE!\ 
(-3.06)
I.D
R2 : .869 -2R*: .839 SE: .00926
F (11,48): 28.863 RSS: .0041
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estimate is large. Besides, this basic specification only 
yields the average contributions of demand variables to growth.
Basic specification (4.20') also serves us for the 
purposes of discussing the meaning of the estimated coeffi­
cients. ag estimates the growth rate in income that would 
occur even if there were no change in exogenous spending 
variables. In this specification, that estimate is very high 
(3.33 percent), and highly significant. Interpretation of 
the other parameters is more complicated. A first approach 
is that coefficients a-p a£, a^ and a4 measure the marginal 
change in the growth rate in income due to a change in the 
growth rates times shares of spending variables. This inter­
pretation is apparent in equation (4.20).
Another interpretation which is more appropriate for 
my purposes can be advanced if we go back to equation (4.19).
If we multiply both sides by Q, we get:
g  = aQ Q + ai • + a2 * + a3 • ||






That is to say, a2 , the parameter corresponding to 
foreign capital inflow, is an estimate of the marginal change 
in income due to a marginal change in foreign capital inflow. 
This cannot be interpreted, though, as a marginal productivity,
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for this result is not derived from the specification of a 
production function, nor is output related to stocks of in­
puts at the margin. But it does estimate the marginal con­
tribution of foreign capital inflows to income increases. 
This can be used as an approximation for the increases in 
income that could be expected from different levels of 
foreign aid at the margin, under the assumptions I have made 
here.
The next step is to consider a set of hypotheses 
aimed at explaining the differences between countries from 
the perspective of demand. They are expected to capture 
institutional and economic structure parameters peculiar to 
each country, which the explanatory variables cannot be ex­
pected to reflect. Some of these parameters will operate 
within the estimates of contributions to growth, defining a 
particular profile for each of them, and others will operate 
as shift factors for .the whole function.
Modeling of the Marginal Contributions of Domestic 
and Foreign Investment. Although model (4.20) assumes that 
the contribution of domestic investment is different from 
that of foreign investment in each country, here I assume 
that both contributions are affected to the same extent by 
the same institutional and economic structure parameters. 
Three hypotheses that may capture the differences in con­
tribution of domestic and foreign investment among countries 
are proposed: differences in the degree of development,
differences in the participation of the government in the
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economic activity, and different possibilities for import 
substitution and industrialization.
The hypothesis of the effect of the degree of develop­
ment on both types of investment contributions to growth is 
justified on the grounds that the more developed a country 
is, the more diversified structure of demand and pattern of 
consumption it can be expected to have, and therefore the 
larger the purchasing power of the population will be.
That means that the multiplicative effect through demand of 
changes in investment will be larger the more developed a 
country is, and therefore the larger the impact of changes 
in investment over the growth in income.
There is no single universally accepted index of 
development. The most commonly used one is per capita in­
come. A search in the literature was performed aimed at 
defining a more appropriate index of development. I finally 
decided for the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI),24 
which was combined with per capita income to obtain a com­
posite index of development.^ it should be clear from the 
discussion in the preceding paragraph that the influence of 
the degree of development on the contribution of investment 
to growth is expected to be positive.
The hypothesis for the impact of the relative parti­
cipation of the government in economic activity over the 
investment contributions states that, generally, the com­
position of the demand by the government is more stable
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than that of private citizens (innovation in consumption, for 
instance, is not one of its features). Therefore, the move­
ment along Cornwall's "hierarchy" of goods would be consider­
ably slower for the government than for private individuals, 
and the larger the share of the government in the economic 
activity, the smaller the impact of demand changes over 
productivity increases .and the rate of transfer of resources. 
Consequently, the larger the share of the government in 
economic activity, the smaller the contribution of invest­
ment is expected to be.
The third structural parameter hypothesized to affect 
investment contributions is the possibility for import sub­
stitution and industrialization. In doing this, I follow 
the arguments developed by R. Prebisch, G. Myrdall, and the 
UN-ECLA in the sense that growth for the majority of LDCs is 
associated with the possibilities for import substitution 
and industrialization. Then, the expansion of the domestic 
market for domestic products is limited by the relative abun­
dance of imports. The larger the imports share in GDP, the 
smaller the domestic market which is left for the expansion 
of industry, and therefore, smaller the impact of investment 
on growth.
The marginal contributions of domestic and foreign 
investment are modeled then as:
13)0
CDI = aj_ = a^Q + all ^  " al2 " a13 (4.22)
CFI = &2 ~ a20 + a21 YL " a22 MS “ a23 (4.23)
CDI: contribution of domestic investment to
growth
CFI: contribution of foreign investment to
growth
YL: composite index of development
GS: government share in GDP
MS: imports share in GDP
Another institutional factor that was expected to 
affect all spending variables' contributions was the effi­
ciency of resource allocation, as represented by the exis­
tence of price disequilibriums: the difference between the
opportunity cost of capital and the interest rate; and the 
difference between the opportunity cost of foreign exchange 
and the exchange rate.^ por the same reasons these factors 
could not be incorporated in the supply model, they are not 
included here either. Nevertheless, it was hypothesized for 
the case of exports that its contribution to growth would be 
negatively affected by overvaluation of the domestic currency. 
Various measures of the extent of exchange rate disequilibrium 
were attempted,^7 and the only one which proved significant 
was the influence of the rate of inflation (average inflation 
rate for the period 1965-1973). This gross measure of the 
existence of foreign exchange disequilibriums can be defended 
on the grounds that most LDCs have government fixed exchange
rates (at least that was the case for the period under con­
sideration) , which tend to become farther from equilibrium 
the larger is the inflation.
The marginal contribution of exports to growth is 
then modeled as:
CX = 33 = a31 - a32 INFL (4.24)
CX: contribution of exports to growth
INFL: average growth rate of increases in
the wholesale price index.
It was finally hypothesized that the size of the 
market was a shift factor for the overall demand relation­
ship. The rationale is that the larger the market, the 
higher the possibilities of exploiting economies of scale.
In other words, the larger the market, the better the chances 
that changes in demand will result in improvements in 
productivity (or that changes in spending variables result 
in changes in output). The relation was assumed to be log- 
linear; and the larger the market, the larger the positive 
shift in the overall function. The log of population was 
found to approximate this effect better.
Introducing equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.24) 
into equation (4.20') and adding the size of the market 
factor, we obtain:^®
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P = ag + (a-^ Q + a-j^  YL - a^2 MS) DD
+ (a20 + a21 YL - a22 MS) FF (4.25)
+ (a3Q - a 31 INFL) XX 
+ NF + LOG N
which may be written in the following more suitable for 
estimation form:
P = Slq +  a^g DD + 3-11 ^  " ^D ” aX2 ^
+ a2Q FF + a21 YL • FF - a22 MS • FF (4.26)
+ a30 XX - a31 I • XX 
+ a4 NF - a5 LOG N.
The results of the above model are reported in Table 
2, Equation 2. All the coefficients had the expected sign, 
and all except three (an, a^2, a22) were significant at 
the 1 percent level. a n  and a22 were significant at the 
5 percent level, and only a n  (coefficient for the effect of 
the degree of development over the contribution of domestic 
capital) was significant at lower, levels (about 10 percent 
in a one tail test). Notwithstanding, since a-Q is only one 
of three coefficients included in the computation of the con­
tribution of domestic investment, and the other two were 
highly significant, a test of significance of the overall 
contribution of domestic investment would surely higher 
levels of confidence.^ As compared to Equation 1, there
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were also gains in explanatory power, and the standard error 
of the estimate was reduced.
Analysis of the differences between actual and 
predicted (according to specification (4.26); Equation 2) 
growth rates in income showed that the residual for Senegal 
(SEN 44) was completely out of line with respect to those 
observed for the rest of the countries. When this situation 
was explored, it was found that Senegal suffered serious 
droughts during most of the years covered by this study, 
which drastically affected its level of output since the 
share of agriculture in GDP amounts to about 50 percent.
As Senegal,was the only country in the sample facing natural 
disasters of this magnitude and persistence, I had to decide 
whether to drop it from the sample or not. For the sake of 
preserving the integrity of the sample (and the methodology 
followed in its selection), I preferred to introduce a dummy 
variable to take account of Senegal's unique circumstances.
The results of regressing this equation are reported as Equa­
tion 3 in Table 2, which show modest improvement over the 
results attained in Equation 2.
Based on the results of Equation 3 (specification 
4.26 with the dummy for Senegal), a comparison between actual 
and predicted growth rates is presented in Table 3. Analysis 
of this Table shows the explanatory power of the model to be 
quite good. It also gives us a hint at the absence of 
heteroscedasticity. for there is no indication that the 
variance of the residuals bears association with the magnitude 
of the growth rate in income (See Graph 1, also).
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Actual versus
T A B L E  3
Predicted Growth Rates' in Income.
ACTUAL PREDICTED DIFFERED
AFG 01 3.2 4.4 -1.2
ALG 02 7.0 7.9 -0.9
AR6 03 4.5 6.2 -1.7
BOL 04 4.9 4.2 0,7
BRA 05 9.0 8.4 0.6
BUR 06 3.0 2.3 0.7
BUI 07 3.5 3.9 -0.4
CAM 08 6.7 5.2 1.5
CHI 09 3.3 3.9 -0.6
COL 10 6.1 5.6 0.5
CUR 11 . 6.8 .7.4 -0.6
CYP 12 7.4 6.7 0.7
DOR 13 8.4 8.1 0.3
ECU 14 6.0 7.4 -1.4
EGY 15 3.3 3.5 -0.2
ELS 16 4.6 4.5 0.1
ETH 17 4.2 4.7 -0.5
GHA 18 3.4 2.6 0.8
GRE 19 8.0 8.0 0.0
GUA 20 6.1 4.8 1.3
GUI 21 3.3 4.1 -0.8
HON 22 4.1 4.5 -0.4
IND 23 3.5 4.9 -1.4
INA 24 6.9 6.4 0.5
IRA 25 11.3 11.0 0.3
ISR 26 9.7 9.5 0.2
I VC 27 7.4 6.9 0.5
JAM 28 6.1 7.1 -1.0
KEN 29 7.1 5.3 1.8
KOR 30 10.9 11,9 -1.0
LIB 31 4.8 4.8 -0,0
MAD 32 2.9 4.5 -1.6
MAI 33 6.2 4.9 1.3
MAL 34 5.8 6.2 -0,4
MEX 35 6.5 6.5 0.0
MOR 36 4.9 4.9 -0.0
NIC 37 4.5 5.2 -0.7
NIG 38 8.7 8.2 0.5
PAK 39 5.4 4.0 1.4
PAN 40 7.6 6.9 0.7
PAR 41 S.l 5.1 0.0
PER 42 4.6 3.4 1.2
PHI 43 5.8 4.9 0.9
SEN 44 1,0 1.0 -0.0
SIL 45 2.9 3.8 -0.9
SIN 46 12.7 12.1 0.6
SPA 47 6.3 6.4 -0.1
SRI 48 4.2 4.2 -0.0
'JUD 49 2.1 3.5 -1.4
SYR 50 6.6 6.2 0.4
TAN 51 5.3 5.3 -0.0
TKA 52 7.4 6.5 0.9
TOG 53 5.0 4.3 0.7
TRT 54 3.8 . 3.9 -0.1
TUN 55 7.7 7.6 0.1
TUR 56 6.6 6.0 0.6
VEN 57 4.5 5.5 -1.0
YUG 58 6.0 6.5 -0.5
ZAI 59 5.8 6.1 -0.3
ZAM 60 2.1 3.3 -1.2
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Some countries, though, still have large differences 
(in percentage) between actual and predicted growth rates: 
Afghanistan, Argentina, India, Madagascar, Sudan, and Zambia. 
Attempts were made at finding common characteristics which 
would justify the inclusion of a dummy for these countries: 
patterns of development (based on Chenery and Syrquin, 1975); 
natural disasters, political disruption, etc. No progress 
was made in these efforts, and no further improvements in 
explanatory power were pursued.
3. Choice of Approach
The results attained with the demand approach are 
incomparably better that those gotten with the supply approach, 
which were not significant. The choice, then, is trivial.
But the choice in not merely justified by comparison, for the 
results attained with the demand model are remarkably good on 
their own, especially if proper attention is given to the 
great heterogeneity of the countries composing the sample.
4. Computation of the Contribution of Foreign 
Investment to Growth
On the basis of the demand model of Equation 3, 
Table 2, the contribution to growth of domestic and foreign 
investment are computed, according to equations (4.22) and 
(4.23). These computations are reported in Table 4.
On the average, the contribution of foreign invest­
ment was found to be larger than that of domestic investment, 
what is consistent with my expectations. An analysis by 
country shows that the differences between domestic and
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T A B L E  4
Domestic and Foreign Capital Contributions.
DOMESTIC FOREIGN
AFG 01 .90 1.06
ALG 02 .62 .82
ARG 03 1.48 2.50
BOL 04 .63 .78
BRA 05 1.26 1.90
BUR 06 1.09 1.46
BUI 07 ,97 1.18
CAM 08 .55 .60
CHI 09 1.20 1.87
COL 10 1.08 1.59
COR 11 . 55 .89
CYP'12 .34 .71
DOR 13 .84 1.21
ECU 14 .89 1.28
EGY 15 .87 1.15
ELS 16 .66 .92
ETH 17 .97 1.16
GHA 18 .78 .97
GRE 19 1.06 1.88
GUA 20 .93 1.30
GUI 21 , 66 .71
HON 22 .57 .72
INP 23 1.22 1.63
INA 24 .90 1.17
IRA 25 .96 1.35
ISR 26 .65 1.48
I VC 27 .29 .22
JAM 28 .41 .72
KEN 29 .51 .56
KOR 30 .71 1.04
LIB 31 .25 .14
MAD 32 .74 .92
MAI 33 .41 .35
MAL 34 .35 .46
MEX 35 1.28 2.01
MOR 36 ,75 .96
NIC 37 .62 .86
NIG 38 .81 .97
PAK 39 .99 1.26
PAN 40 .44 .74
PAR 41 1.05 1.55
PER 42 1.01 1.48
PHI 43 ,96 1.38
SEN 44 .54 .57
SIL 45 .52 .54
SIN 46 1.15 1.95
SPA 47 1.24 2.15
SRI 48 .86 1.24
SUD 49 .83 1.02
SYR 50 ,73 .99
TAN 51 .54 .55
THA 52 .85 1.20
TOG 53 .53 .55
TRT 54 .49 .88
TUN 55 .62 • 80
TUR 56 1.21 1.75
VEN 57 1.10 1,90
YUG 58 .93 1.51
ZAI 59 .19 .02
ZAM 60 .17 .06
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foreign investment contributions are in most cases substan­
tial, and consistent with what one would expect on the basis 
of the crucial role of foreign capital inflows in the process 
of growth in LDCs.
The few countries which have almost identical contribu­
tions of domestic and foreign investment were also the ones 
which were at the lowest end of degree of development, and 
therefore are most likely at the early stages of the fulfill­
ment of the "pre-conditions" for growth. The four countries 
where domestic investment contribution was found to be 
larger than that of foreign investment (Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Zaire, and Zambia) were not amongst the least developed, but 
all had very large shares of imports in GDP, and very small 
contributions of investment (both domestic and foreign) rela­
tive to the rest of the countries. This suggests the exis­
tence in these countries of very strong constraints to the 
process of growth.
Summing up, these estimates of the contribution of 
foreign capital inflows provide us with a basic profile of 
the performance that aid can be expected to have in terms of 
growth for each country. The model from which these esti­
mates are derived possesses remarkably good explanatory power, 
and the significance of the specific coefficients is very 
high, which points to the reliability of the estimates.
Finally, the differences between contributions of domestic 
and foreign investment, on the average and for each country, 
conform to our expectations.
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III. Proposed Aid Allocation
The methodology for determining proposed aid alloca­
tion to each country is the same followed in Chapter Three in 
the application of the model to the groups of countries con­
sidered by Edelman and Chenery (1977). The allocation index 
is comprised of two multipliers: one, population shares;
and two, a performance cum need multiplier, which is the 
ratio of aid performance relative to per capita income for 
each country, to the population weighted average of the same 
ratio for all countries. The allocation index is:
OMGi : allocation index for country i
CFIi : contribution of foreign investment
in country i 
Yj_: per capita income of country i
n-j^ /N: population shares
The first term of the right side of equation (4.27)
is the population multiplier: it gives the aid allocation
that would result from granting aid strictly on the basis of 
the number of people who would benefit from it. The second 
term is the performance cum need multiplier, which adjusts 
the population multiplier upward or downward according to the 
relative performance cum need for each country.
(CFI/Y)i
(4.27)
Z ^  (CFI/Y)i
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Allocation index OMG^ has the following properties: 
first, aid to each country is directly proportional to the 
contribution to growth aid is expected to have in each country. 
The estimate of this contribution was obtained from the demand 
model, and reflects past performance of foreign investment. 
Second, aid to each country is inversely proportional to 
per capita income (or directly proportional to level of 
poverty). Third, the allocation index includes the number of 
people relative to the total population of countries considered 
(population multiplier), so that it considers the welfare im­
pact of aid granted to each country. And fourth, the avail­
able pool of aid would always be completely exhausted, and 
total proposed aid would always be consistent with available 
aid.
Table 5 reports the variables used in the computa­
tions of the allocation index, and Table 6 reports the popula­
tion multiplier, the performance cum need multiplier, and 
the allocation index. Both the poDulation multiplier and 
the allocation index are expressed in percentage points for 
convenience.
It is interesting to notice the way the contribution 
of foreign investment, per capita income and population 
shares interact to compose the allocation index. For in­
stance, India is the country with the highest allocation 
index (57 percent). Its population share is also the highest 
in the sample (34.7 percent), but the performance multiplier 
raises the population multiplier because India has a good
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T A B L E  5
CQNT»FOR.K P.C.INCOME POPULATION ALLOCATION.IND
(dollars) “ (nrTlHon) ( % )
AFG 01 1.06 69.00 13.90 1.30
ALG 02 0.92 397.00 13.01 0.16
ARG 03 2.50 1171.00 22.87 0.30
BOL 04 0.78 169.00 4.82 0.13
BRA 05 1.90 481.00 90.41 2.16
BUR 06 1.46 62.00 27.04 3.87
BUI 07 1.18 60.00 3.31 0.40
CAM 08 0.60 171.00 5.75 0.12
CHI 09 1.87 546.00 9.51 0.20
COL 10 1.59 308.00 21.02 0.66
COR 11 0.89 492.00 1.68 0.02
CYF' 12 0.71 963.00 0.63 0.00
DOR 13 1.21 338.00 3.93 0.09
ECU 14 1.28 271.00 5.95 0.17
EGY 15 1.15 193.00 32.49 1.18
ELS 16 0.92 269.00 3.34 0.07
ETH 17 1.16 68.00 24.03 2.48
GHA 18 0.97 237.00 8.33 0.21
GRE 19 1.88 1176.00 8.76 0.08
GUA 20 1.30 345.00 4.77 0.11
GUI 21 0.71 84.00 3.85 0.20
HON 22 0.72 244.00 2.47 0.04
IND 23 1.63 91.00 526.78 57.36
INA 24 1.17 89.00 114.19 9.12
IRA 25 1.35 526.00 28.39 0.44
ISR 26 1.48 1938.00 2.85 0.01
IVC 27 0.22 260.00 4.92 0.03
JAM 28 0.72 667.00 1.86 0.01
KEN 29 0.56 119.00 10.95 0.31
KOR 30 1.04 234.00 30.71 0.83
LIB 31 0.14 212.00 1.26 0.00
MAD 32 0.92 118.00 6.91 0.33
MAI 33 0.35 74.00 4.37 0.13
MAL 34 0.46 394.00 10.59 0.08
MEX 35 2.01 638.00 49.11 .0.94
MOR 36 0.96 229.00 14.86 0.38
NIC 37 0.86 407.00 1.97 0.03
NIG 38 0.97 134.00 64.69 2.83
PAK 39 1.26 87.00 60.74 5.35
PAN 40 0.74 638.00 1.39 0.01
PAR 41 1.55 297.00 2.17 0.07
PER 42 1.48 461.00 13.00 0.25
PHI 43 1.38 201.00 35.82
SEN 44 0.57 235.00 3.75. 0.06
SIL 45 0.54 124.00 2.56 0.07
SIN 46 1.95 1001.00 2.04 0.02
SPA 47 2.15 1117.00 33.31 0.39
SRI 48 1.24 89.00 12.29 1.03
CUD 49 1.02 88.00 15.31 1.07
SYR 50 0.99 272.00 6.12 0.13
TAN 51 0.55 95.00 12.58 0.44
THA 52 1.20 183.00 35.09 1.40
TOG 53 0.55 135.00 1.88 0.05
TRT 54 0.88 711.00 1.02 0.01
TUN 55 0.80 300.00 5.03 0.08
TUR 56 1.75 407.00 34.45 0.90
VEN 57 1.90 1195.00 10.03 0.10
YIJG 58 1.51 666.00 20.20 0.28
2AI 59 0.02 99.00 17.69 0.02
2AM 60 0.06 330,00 4.15 0.00
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T A B L E 6
POP.MULT PERFOR.i
AFG 01 0,916 1.417
ALG 02 0.858 0.139
ARG 03 1 .508 0.196
DDL 04 0.318 0.424
BRA 05 5,960 0,36,3
BUR 06 1.733 2.172
BUI 07 0.218 1.811
CAM 08 0,379 0.323
CHI 09 0,627 0.315
COL J.0 1.386 0 .475
COR 11 0.111 0.167
CYP 12 0.042 0.068
DOR 13 0.259 0.323
ECU 14 0.392 0.433
EGY 15 2.142 0.549
ELS 16 0.220 0.315
ETH 17 1,584 1,568
GHA 18 0.549 0.378
GRE 19 0.577 0,147
GIJA 20 0.314 0.348
GUI 21 0.254 0.775
HON 22 0.163 0.271
IND 23 34.727 1.652
INA 24 7.528 1.212
IRA 25 1 .872 0 ,237
ISR 26 0.183 0.070
JVC 27 0.324 0.078
JAM 23 0.123 0.100
KEN 29 0.722 0.431
KOR 30 2.025 0.410
LIB 31 0.083 0.059
MAD 32 0.456 0.718
MAI 33 0,233 0.436
MAL. 34 0.698 0.108
MEX 35 3.233 0.239
MOP 36 0.930 0.385
NIC 37 0.130 0.193
NIG 38 4.265 0.665
PAK 39 4.004 1 .336
PAN 40 0,092 0.107
PAR 41 0,143 0.481
PER 42 0.857 0.296
PHI 43 2,361 0.632
3EN 44 0.247 0.223
SII. 45 0.169 0,393
GIN 46 0.134 0.179
GPA 47 2.196 0.177
GRI 48 0.810 1.277
GUD 49 1.009 1.065
SYR 50 0.403 0.334
TAN 51 0.829 0.534
THA 52 2.313 0.606
TOG 53 0.124 0.374
TRI' 54 0,067 0,113
TUN 55 0.332 0.244
TUR 56 2,271 0.396
YEN 57 0,661 0.147
VUG 53 1.332 0.208
2 AI 59 1.166 0.017































































contribution of foreign investment (1.63) and is also amongst 
the poorest countries. Colombia, on the other hand, has a 
CFI slightly below that of India, but is about three and a 
half times richer, what results in a performance multiplier 
of less than one third that of India. If population were 
not considered, Colombia would receive less than one third 
of aid received by India, while the population of India is 
about 25 times larger than that of Colombia. When the popula­
tion multiplier is included, that anomaly is immediately 
eliminated.
If we look at Burma, its share in population is 
1.8 percent and its allocation index is about 3.9 percent.
This is due to the fact that this country has a good per­
formance, and is the second poorest in the sample, what 
results in the highest performance cum need multiplier.
Burma can be compared with Peru, which has almost identical 
performance (contribution of foreign investment), but is 
about seven and a half times richer and has about half the 
population.
Argentina is the country with the highest performance, 
but is also the second richest in the sample, so that its per­
formance cum need multiplier is very low, such that its popu­
lation multiplier is reduced to one fifth when its alloca­
tion index is determined.
Israel has the same performance as Burma, but it is 
the richest country in the sample and is amongst the coun­
tries with smaller populations. Its allocation index is 
almost negligible compared to that of Burma.
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Yet, relatively rich LDCs with good performance, as 
Argentina (the best performer and second richest in the 
sample), would still be eligible for receiving aid according 
to this system of allocation.31
If we move now to the other extreme, that of Zaire, 
a very poor country which has the lowest performance in the 
sample, resulting in an extremely low allocation index.
Though the case of Zaire is unique amongst the poorest coun­
tries, it points to one shortcoming of using population 
weights, as done here, as compared to the use of "poverty- 
weights."32
The next step is to determine proposed aid alloca­
tion to each country for each category of aid considered in 
the analysis. This is done according to the formula:
Aj = Fj • OMGi (4.28)
F-5 : available pool of category 1 of aid 
A^: category ^ of aid proposed to country i 
OMG^: country i allocation index
The different categories of aid considered are 
listed in Table 7, and the results of computations of (4.28), 
broken down into actual, proposed by the model, and the dif­
ference between actual and proposed aid to each country, for 
each category of aid, are reported in Appendix I.
As an overall measure of the discrepancies between 
aid proposed by the model and actual aid allocation (either
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TABLE 7 . 
Categories of A i d .
N1M : Nominal Commitments , average 1967-69, Multilateral.
NIB : , Bilateral.
NIT :  , Total.
N2M :   , average 1970-72, Multilateral.
N2B : , Bilateral.
N2T :  , Total.
N3M :   , average 1973-74, Multilateral.
N3B :  , Bilateral.
N3T : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , Total.
G1M : Grant Equivalent Commitments , av. 1967-69, Multilateral
GIB : , Bilateral.
GIT :  , Total.
G2M :   , av. 1970-72, Multilateral
G2B : , Bilateral.
G2T :   , Total.
G3M : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  , av. 1973-74, Multilateral
G3B : , Bilateral.
G3T :  , Total.
NOF.M : Net Official Flows , average 1969-73, Multilateral.
NOF.B : , Bilateral.
NOF.T : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , Total.
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commitments, or actual NOF), the standard deviation of the 
differences between actual and proposed aid was computed for 
each category of aid.33 These discrepancies were not expected 
to be small, since we know the criteria for aid allocation in 
which this model is based were not being followed by donors 
during the period this study considers (See Table 8).
The conclusions that can be derived from these mea­
sures of discrepancies are: first, there are wide overall
differences between actual and proposed aid allocation for 
all categories, in all periods. Excluding categories of 
Totals (the addition of multilateral and bilateral), the dis­
persion of differences ranges from a low of 27.5, in NOF of 
Multilateral Aid (NOF.M), to a high of 386.7, in Nominal 
Commitments of Multilateral Aid for the average of 1973-1974 
(N3M). It should not be a surprise to find these large dis­
crepancies, for we know the major concern of donors during 
this period lied in growth performance, and not in need 
(as measured here) or poverty levels as emphasized in this 
study.34 And it confirms our suspicion that actual aid al­
location is very far apart from that one which would have 
maximized world welfare derived from aid. Therefore, it 
points to the potential advantages of allocating aid in 
the way proposed by this model.
A second conclusion is that the discrepancies between 
actual and proposed aid are smaller in aid granted by Multi­
lateral Agencies than aid granted by Bilateral Agencies for 
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TABLE 8 .
Overall dispersion of differences between actual 
and proposed aid allocation .



































in the period 1973-1974 (N3M). This result could indicate 
that the criteria for aid allocation applied by Multilateral 
Agencies are closer to the ones proposed in this study than 
the criteria applied by Bilateral Agencies. Or, in other 
words, that more consideration was given to need (as mea­
sured by per capita income) by Multilateral Agencies than by 
Bilateral Agencies.
A third conclusion is that for the category of com­
mitments of aid, the differences between actual and proposed 
aid are smaller when expressed in grant equivalent terms than 
in nominal terms. This could be taken as a confirmation that 
the terms of aid is another variable which is taken into con­
sideration in the decision of allocating aid. In other words, 
a way used by donors to account for poverty might be to grant 
aid in "softer" terms to poorer countries. As an example of 
this, richer LDCs do not qualify for loans from the Inter­
national Development Association (IDA), which is the "soft" 
window of the World Bank.
It is interesting to remark that this effect seems 
to be much stronger in multilateral than in bilateral aid.
For instance, the dispersion of nominal multilateral commit­
ments for the period 1967-1969 (N1M) is more than one half 
that of nominal bilateral commitments for the same period 
(NIB), while the same comparison in grant equivalent terms 
shows the dispersion of multilateral (G1M) as about one third 
of that of bilateral aid (GIB). The same comparison holds 
for the next period (1970-1972). In the third period (1973-
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1974), multilateral commitments in nominal terms (N3M) have 
a larger dispersion than bilateral commitments (N3B), while 
in grant equivalent terms the dispersion of multilateral 
commitments (G3M) is again smaller than that of bilateral 
commitments (G3B).
A fourth conclusion about the extent of the discrep­
ancies between actual and proposed commitment of aid is that 
there appears to be an increase in these discrepancies as we 
go from the fist (1967-1969) to the third period (1973-1974). 
One could conclude this to be an indication that, through 
time, the criteria for allocating aid actually applied by 
donors have contemplated poverty and world welfare considera­
tions (as considered in this study) with decreasing emphasis. 
Nevertheless, that conclusion would not be guaranteed by the 
methodology I have followed here: the foreign investment
performance estimates, per capita income and population 
shares figures used are those for the average of the period 
1965-1973. It could well be, then, that at least part of the 
increases in dispersion of differences between actual and 
proposed aid be the consequence of actual aid be based on the 
most recent data of performance and per capita income, which 
I did not consider here.
Finally, the dispersion of differences for Net Offi­
cial Flows (NOF) (annual average for the period 1969-1973) are 
smaller than those for commitment figures. Actually, the 
dispersion of multilateral Net Official Flows (NOF.M) is the 
smaller of all categories of aid considered: less than one
1 30
half that of multilateral commitments in grant equivalent 
terms for 1967-1969, and about one third of that for a more 
directly comparable period, 1970-1972. As NOF figures refer 
to disbursed aid net of repayments of principal and interest, 
these results could be an indication that debt service 
capacity considerations are given a greater weight in the 
final decision of granting aid than in formulating commitments.
FOOTNOTES FROM CHAPTER FOUR
^-Without "modeling" the productivities, we would get 
the average productivity of aid for all countries, which of 
course, would be of no major use for my present purposes.
^According to the theoretical model developed in 
Chapter III, the estimates of the marginal productivity of aid 
(those obtainable through a supply approach) would be prefer­
able. But if the supply approach yields poor results (in 
statistical inference terms) as compared to a demand approach, 
then we have to prefer an approximation to the theoretical 
best which is better in terms of estimation.
•^ That would require data on capital stock, which is 
not available.
^See Edelman and Chenery (1977), p. 31 and p. 48,
Note 8. Their sample LDCs countries reported by the OECD 
consisted of 89 of the 140. It included only the countries 
which had been active borrowers from the World Bank during 
the period 1969-1974. I took this as one of my sources 
because I was interested in including in the analysis aid 
allocated by the World Bank, which represents about half the 
aid allocated by Multilateral Agencies.
^OECD Reviews' data on Net Official Flows (NOF) for 
years before 1969 included only major borrowers of aid. If 
I had decided to use data for previous years, I would have 
had to further reduce the size of my sample.
^Richer LDCs tend to receive aid in "harder" terms.
In nominal values, this phenomenon is not reflected, while 
grant equivalent aid reflects more accurately the level of 
aid at the same concessional terms received by a country.
^This is contended by Cline and Sargen (1975). On 
the other hand, J.. B. Knapp (1973) contends that Multilateral 
Agencies are not much more insulated from political pressures, 
since multilateral agencies are also multipolitical institu­
tions. In any way, the case can still be made that in multi­
political agencies there exist countervailing forces which 
do not exist in bilateral agencies, such that aid allocation 
represents less the biases of any particular donor.
®I follow the methodology presented in Singh (1975), 
Chapter 6 , pp. 185-232.
g
His justification is: "Anything that affects output
is a factor of production and when we talk of the "gains from 
trade," we have already admitted imports as a factor of 
production." Singh (1975), p. 195.
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the elasticities of output with respect to 
domestic and foreign capitals are assumed constant, and the 
rates of capital depreciation fairly similar between coun­
tries, then b: : can be assumed constant. See Armstrong and 
Lambelet (1970).
H-This assumption is also made by Singh (1975) and 
is confirmed by a small range of variation in the labor 
participation rates.
l^For an analysis of the meaning of the constant term, 
ag» under different assumptions about the type of production 
function, technological change and depreciation rates, see 
Armstrong and Lambelet (1970).
13see Singh (1975), pp. 192-198.
■^Data furnished by Singh (1975) is for the period 
1960-1965. Even in his case, the sources of data for public 
investment shares and price disequilibrium were country- 
economists of the World Bank, where Singh was working while 
he conducted his study. So, lack of data accounts for the 
lack of inclusion of these variables.
l^See Singh (1975), p. 190.
16See Singh (1975), p. 198.
■^The effect of labor is now captured by ag. See 
Armstrong and Lambelet (1970), p. 255.
^Cornwall (1970), p. 52.
l^Roemer (1970), p. 50.
20cornwall (1970), p. 60.
21Cornwall (1970), p. 61.
22This methodology follows M. Ghali (1973, 1976).
23This will be the case if both the consumption
function and the import function are linear.
24See J. W. Sewell (1977), pp. 160-171.
25per capita income figures were reduced to the same 
scale as that of the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) 
and then averaged. This was done by taking the per capita 
income of the country with the largest PQLI in the sample as
the basis (Spain) and then reducing that proportion to the
scale of Spain's PQLI. Resulting figures for per capita 
income were then arithmetically averaged with those for PQLI.
26singh (1975, Chapter 6) uses these two price dis­
equilibrium indexes as the most indicative of the efficiency 
in resources allocation.
2?Different formulations for disequilibrium in ex­
change rates were performed on the basis of comparisons 
between changes in official exchange rates and different 
price indexes (consumer, whoesale and implicit GDP deflator).
^The effect of government share in the economic 
activity was not found significant, reason why it is not 
reported here.
29This test can be constructed following the 
methodology proposed in J. Rmenta (1971, p. 444).
30see OECD 1976 Review, Chapter VIII.
3lThis results should be compared with the proposi­
tions of establishing cut-off per capita income levels above 
which aid would not be granted. See Cline and Sargen (1975 ) 
and Isenman (1976).
•^Notwithstanding, the use of poverty-weights would 
not in itself solve the problems of Zaire, but further improve 
the situation of countries as poor but with better performance.
33-rhere is no basis for assuming any type of proba­
bility distributions for these differences, which would have 
permitted to test the hypothesis of equivalence between 
actual and proposed aid allocation. As it turned out, the 
standard deviations of these differences are so large that 
the hypothesis of equivalence would have been rejected anyway.
3 4 - R e c a l l  that studies on aid allocation for different 
years of this period found no significant association between 
aid and per capita income, overall, and a positive associa­
tion with certain categories of aid (see Chapter Two).
CHAPTER V 
CONCULSION
The subject of this Dissertation has been to devise 
a model for the allocation of aid such that the welfare ef­
fects of aid-induced growth be maximized.
The review of the general approaches to aid alloca­
tion proposed in the past revealed that both the Two-Gap 
(Chenery and Strout, 1965, 1966) and the Economic Development 
Potential (Adelman and Morris, 1968) approaches concentrated 
in the growth effects of aid, without paying attention to 
the welfare implications of aid-induced growth. This empha­
sis on growth was disputed by the Growth cum Distribution 
or Poverty-Focused (Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974) approach, 
which contended that if the goal of foreign aid was to 
promote development, aid-indiced growth could not be con­
templated in isolation from its effects upon income distribu­
tion between different segments of the population, and between 
countries. Moreover, it would not suffice to include in the 
process of aid allocation variables reflecting the concern 
about income distribution, but it was necessary to reframe 
the analysis in a Theory of Growth cum (at the same time as) 
Distribution, which they developed.
Two attempts in the past at explicitly contemplating 
welfare impact of aid-induced growth between countries were 
reviewed. Cline and Sargen (1975), on the basis of a priori
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definition of a set of "desirable properties" that an alloca­
tion system should fulfill, postulated that aid granted to 
a country should be inversely related to its per-capita in­
come (a measure of degree of poverty). At the same time, 
no aid should be granted to countries whose per capita in­
comes were higher than a certain arbitrary selected cut-off 
per capita income level. And proposed aid should also be 
directly related to economic performance, the assessment of 
which should be based on objective variables. Finally, pro­
posed aid levels should be "harmonized" with aid availability. 
Nevertheless, they did not propose, nor systematically derive, 
an optimizing model as the one proposed here.
Edelman and Chenery (1977) developed.a welfare mea­
sure a la Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) which was used to dis­
cuss the potential welfare gains that would accrue from 
granting more aid to poorer countries. Though the idea of 
maximizing the welfare effects of a given pool of aid was 
implicit in their analysis, no explicit effort at formulating 
an optimizing model was attempted either. Besides, in their 
application to two groups of countries they assumed constant 
productivity of aid (approximated by the incremental output- 
capital ratio), what actually implies that the welfare 
derived from aid would be highest if all aid were granted to 
the group of countries with the highest ratio of aid produc­
tivity to per capita income (that is to say, their methodology 
implies "corner" solutions).
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In my critique to these attempts I contended that, 
over and above their empirical shortcomings, they were 
liable of two methodological limitations. The first one 
referred to the procedure used to establish the criteria for 
aid allocation they propose, as well as the direction of the 
association that those criteria should bear with aid. For 
example, how is it justified that aid performance, or that 
the overall performance of the economy, should be one such 
criterion, and why better performance (relative to the rest 
of the countries, or with respect to certain minimum accept­
able standards of performance) should be rewarded with more 
aid. Or why the degree of poverty should be another criterion, 
and why the poorer a country is the larger the aid it would 
be eligible to receive.
On this light, the consideration by Cline and Sargen 
(1975) of performance and equity criteria was found to be 
postulated a priori. And the criteria of aid productivity 
and per capita income contemplated by Edelman and Chenery 
(1977) were found to be strictly justified on the basis of 
the Poverty-Focused approach to aid allocation. It should 
be noticed, however, that Edelman and Chenery did not pro­
pose a system of aid allocation properly, but merely dis­
cussed the gains in LDCs' joint welfare obtainable from ef­
fecting an arbitrary reallocation of aid, in favor of poorer 
LDCs.
The second methodological limitation of past norma­
tive models of aid allocation was related to the way the
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selection of specific indices, intended to approximate the 
criteria previously selected, was justified. For example, 
if performance were selected as one criterion, such that 
better performances were rewarded with more aid, the ques­
tion now is: how is performance measured or approximated?
The review of past attempts found that Cline and Sargen (1975) 
did not justify their selection of indices at all. Edelman 
and Chenery (1977), on their part, approximated their per­
formance criterion, aid productivity, by the overall incre­
mental output-capital ratio. On the light of development 
theory, this approximation is, at best, highly questionable.
The theoretical model of allocation developed in 
Chapter Three constitutes a systematic derivation of the 
relevant criteria and their direction of association with 
aid, as well as the specific economic variables to be con­
templated in the analysis. The first step consisted of the 
formulation of a world social welfare function based on the 
Poverty-Focused approach of Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974).
Since the analysis is restricted to the short-run, income 
levels approximate welfare levels for each country. These 
income levels enter into the world social welfare function 
weighted by each country's population share in overall popu­
lation. As discussed in Chapter Three, this procedure fol­
lows an "equal weights" scheme, which implies that the wel­
fare of each country (the level of income) weights into the 
world social welfare according to the number of people who 
benefit from it. This corresponds to apply simple equity 
considerations.
The second step consisted of the definition of the 
level of income in terms of a production function, where aid 
is treated as another productive factor. Since the model is 
intended to represent the effects of different aid alloca­
tions over the world social welfare in one moment in time, 
other inputs than aid are taken as constant. This allows 
to make world social welfare a function of both aid levels 
and its distribution, which permits to analyze the effects 
of marginal changes in aid to each country over world social 
welfare.
The advantages of this method over previous ap­
proaches are apparent: first, substitutability between pro­
ductive factors is permitted, and the productivity of aid is 
not assumed to be constant. Second, world social welfare 
becomes a function of aid, which is the variable relevant 
for the analysis. Third, since aid is treated as a produc­
tive factor, the productivity of aid becomes the performance 
index, representing the contribution to growth aid can be 
expected to have in each country. And fourth, the estima­
tion of the productivity of aid would be based on historical 
data, and it would thus be a measure of past economic 
performance.
The third step involved maximizing the world social 
welfare function subject to available aid. It was found 
that the necessary conditions for a maximum is met when aid 
is distributed in such a way that the ratio of the produc­
tivity of aid to per capita income is equal for all countries.
A norm for aid allocation would then be to relate 
aid to each country directly to aid productivity and inversely 
to per capita income. Three points were made in this respect. 
First, this norm is consistent with those proposed in the 
literature, with the difference that this one is systemat­
ically derived from our model, whereas the norms previously 
used were given a priori. Second, the interaction between 
aid performance and per capita income (or need) is continuous, 
what is more reasonable then postulating arbitrary cut-off 
per capita incomes, as developed by Cline and Sargen (1975) 
and accepted by Isenman (1976) . Finally, the time path of 
aid to a country as it gets into higher per capita income 
levels would be downward sloped and continuous: the richer
a country becomes the lower aid levels it would receive, 
adjusted by the performance of aid in that country. But no 
matter how rich a LDC country is, good aid performance would 
still make it eligible to receive aid.
The final step consisted of deriving the allocation 
index according to which available aid would be distributed 
among countries. The allocation index was found to be a 
composite of two multipliers: first, a multiplier for
population shares, which yields the allocation of aid that 
would result on the basis of equity principles alone. And 
second, a performance multiplier obtained as each country's 
performance relative to the population weighted average per­
formance for all counties, which adjusts upward or downward 
the populations shares multiplier.
The results of the development of the theoretical 
model of aid allocation can now be summed up: first, an
allocation index was obtained which contemplates aid per­
formance, need (as measured by per capita income) and popu­
lation shares as the relevant variables. Second, this al­
location index was systematically derived from the maximiza­
tion of a world social function under the constraint of 
available aid. Third, application of the allocation index 
ensures that proposed aid allocation be consistent with aid 
availability. And fourth, the variables composing the al­
location index and the specification of their relationship 
to proposed aid, were also obtained through the development 
of the model. Consequently, this system of allocation is 
strictly justified under the premises adopted here.
The empirical application of this model for aid al­
location was performed over a sample of 60 LDCs for different 
categories of aid; for the period 1965-1973. It was not 
possible to estimate production functions for the majority 
of the countries. Therefore, alternative methods to estimate 
the productivity of aid - which was approximated by the pro­
ductivity of foreign capital inflows - were attempted. A 
supply approach was followed first, but did not give sig­
nificant outcomes. When a demand approach was attempted next, 
the results were remarkably good and highly significant.
This explains why the supply approach was rejected, and the 
computations which followed were based on the demand approach 
exclusively.
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The estimates of aid performance obtained through the 
demand approach correspond to the marginal contribution of 
aid changes to income changes. This concept is not equiva­
lent to the marginal productivity of capital, which was the 
variable obtained from the theoretical model to account for 
performance. Notwithstanding, it was hypothesized that as 
long as these marginal contributions reflected with accuracy 
the differences in growth performance of aid between coun­
tries , they would provide sufficient information to carry out 
the empirical application. Both the explanatory power of 
the demand model and the significance of the estimated para­
meters speak for themselves about the accuracy of the esti­
mates. The differences in foreign investment's marginal con­
tributions between countries, and with respect to the mar­
ginal contributions of other spending variables, take care 
of the rest of the hypothesis.
An empirical approximation to the theoretical best 
allocation index was performed. Identical variables were 
considered and with equivalent specification: first, a
measure of aid performance (the contribution of foreign in­
vestment to growth); second, a measure of need (per capita 
income); and third, population shares. This empirical al­
location index was also composed of two multipliers: one,
population shares; and two a performance cum need multiplier. 
The analysis of the way these variables interact to conform 
the allocation index showed the relevant influences
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(performance, need, and populations shares) to operate 
adequately.
When this allocation index was applied to different 
categories of aid for different periods, large discrepancies 
between actual and proposed aid were apparent. These results 
were according to our expectations: there is evidence that
the criteria for allocation used by donors during the 
period covered in this study mostly emphasized growth, and 
therefore performance (however measured), without dedicating 
much attention to the welfare implications of aid-induced 
growth (as done here).
The discrepancies between actual and proposed aid 
were found to be smaller for aid commitments expressed in 
grant equivalent terms than in nominal terms, and also 
smaller for Multilateral than for Bilateral aid. These 
results were also consistent to our expectations, and hypo­
theses aimed at explaining these phenomena were advanced.
Finally, the discrepancies between actual and pro­
posed aid were smaller for NOF than for any other category 
of aid. This result contradicted my expectations, and needs 
to be further explored.
The overall review of the contents of this Disserta­
tion shows that a system for the allocation of aid which ful­
fills all a priori desirable properties was developed. More­
over, this model of allocation is superior to the ones 
developed in the past, for it is strictly justified in 
theoretical terms, and it is aimed at the maximization of
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the goals set for foreign aid, which past models did not.
The empirical application of this model showed mixed results 
with respect to our expectations. Nevertheless, the one 
result that is clearly apparent and indisputable is that the 
potential advantages in terms of LDCs' social welfare of 
applying a model of allocation as this one are immense.
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APPENDIX 1 
Actual versus Proposed Aid Allocation 
for Different Categories of Aid
1.45
Nominal Commitments of Multilateral Aid (av. 1970-72)
ACTUAL.N2M PROPOSED.N2M DIFFERENCE.N2M
AFG 01 12.70 46.80 -34.10
ALG 02 15.50 5.85 9.65
ARG 03 165.60 10.66 154.94
EOL 04 28.70 4.85 23.85
BRA 05 501.50 77.92 423.58
BUR 06 3.10 139.56 -136.46
BUI 07 8.90 14.24 -5.34
CAM 08 28.40 4.41 23.99
CHI 09 21.70 7.12 14.58
COL 10 171.30 23.71 147.59
COR 11 26.90 0.67 26.23
CYP 12 9.50 0.10 9.40
DOR 13 16.70 3.06 13.64
ECU 14 39.10 6.13 32.97
EGY 15 36.10 42.41 -6.31
ELS 16 23.10 2.50 20.60
ETH 17 26.20 89.53 -63.33
GHA IB 8.50 7.48 1.02
GRE 19 39.90 3.06 36.84
GUA 20 7.50 3.94 3.56
GUI 21 6.20 7.09 -0.89
HON 22 18.20 1.59 16.61
IND 23 332.80 2067.34 -1734.54
INA 24 134.50 328.68 -194.18
IRA 25 137.30 15.96 121.34
ISR 26 36.00 0.47 35.53
I VC 27 38.40 0.91 37.49
JAM 28 14.60 0.44 14.16
KEN 29 76.30 11.22 65.08
KOR 30 146.20 29.89 116.31
LIB 31 9.60 0.18 9.42
MAD 32 24.80 11.78 13.02
MAI 33 8.10 4.52 3.58
MAL 34 65.20 2.72 62.48
MEX 35 273.40 33.76 239.64
MOR 36 57.40 13.58 43.82.
NIC 37 20.50 0.91 19.59
NIG 38 96.40 102.15 -5.75
PAK 39 24.50 192.84 -168.34
PAN 40 35.90 0.35 35.55
PAR 41 18.70 2.48 16.22
PER 42 42.60 9.15 33.45
PHI 43 72.30 53.74 18.56
CEN 44 27.00 1.99 25.01
SIL 45 6.60 2.42 4.18
SIN 46 35.40 0.87 34.53
SPA 47 59.70 14.00 45.70
SRI 48 15.20 37.29 -22.09
RU.Q 49 19.00 38.73 -19.73
SIR 50 14.40 4.86 9.54
TAN 51 26.50 15.97 10.53
THA 52 79.50 50.48 29.02
TOG 53 8.60 1.67 6.93
TRT 54 13.40 0.27 13.13
TUN 55 40,20 2.92 37.28
TUR 56 133.30 32.41 100.89
VEN 57 78.80 3.49 75.31
YUG 58 109.30 ' 10.00 99.30
ZAI 59 37.60 0.70 36.90
ZAM 60 18.60 0.17 18.43
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Nominal Commitments of Bilateral Aid (av. 1970-72)
ACTUAL.N2B PROPOSED.N2B DIFFERENCE.N2B
AFO 01 44.80 59.84 -15.04
ALG 02 90.50 7.48 83.02
ARG 03 12.00 13.64 -1.64
BOL 04 32.30 6.21 26.09
BRA OS 111.20 99.64 11.56
BUR 06 44.60 178.46 -133.86
BUI 07 11.70 18.21 -6.51
CAM 08 48.30 5.64 42.66
CHI 0? 33.20 9.11 24.09
COL 10 112.30 30.32 81.98
COR 11' 11.90 0.85 11.05
CYP 12 4.80 0.13 4.67
DOR 13 26.90 3.92 22.98
ECU 14 31.10 7.84 23.26
EGY 15 58.60 54.24 4.36
ELS 16 8.20 3.19 5.01
ETH 17 62.70 114.48 -51.78
GHA 18 52.20 9.57 42.63
GRE 19 2.40 3.91 -1.51
GUA 20 22.90 5.04 • 17.86
GUI 21 10.40 9.07 1.33
HON 22 8.30 2.03 6.27
IND 23 772.60 2643.56 -1870.96
INA 24 682.50 420.29 262.21
IRA 25 17.10 20.41 -3.31
ISR 26 128.30 0.61 127.69
IVC 27 62.70 1.17 61.53
JAM 28 21. /O 0.56 21.14
KEN 29 81.90 14.34 67.56
KOR 30 373.10 38.23 334.87
LIB 31 12.20 0.23 11.97
MAD 32 51.00 15.07 35.93
MAI 33 30.30 5.78 24.52
MAL 34 43.70 3.47 40.23
MEX 35 6.50 43.17 -36.67
MOR 36 112.80 17.37 95.43
NIC 37 12.30 1.16 11.14
NIG 38 98.00 130.62 -32.62
PAK 39 289.00 246.59 42.41
PAN 40 21.50 0.45 21.05
PAR 41 12.50 3.17 9.33
PER 42 64.20 11.70 52.50
PHI 43 132.60 68.72 63.88
SEN 44 49.60 2.54 47.06
SIL 45 8.90 3.10 5.80
SIN 46 13.90 1.11 12.79
SPA 47 11.70 17.90 -6.20
SRI 48 46.10 47.68 -1.58
SUD 49 14*40 49.53 -35.13
SYR 50 0.90 6*21 -5.31
TAN 51 71.10 20.43 50.67
THA 52 54.20 64.55 -10.35
TOG 53 13.80 2.14 11.66
TRT 54 1.20 0.35 0.85
TUN 55 113.80 3.73 110.07
TUR 56 187.00 41.44 145.56
VEN 57 7.60 4.47 3.13
YUG 58 66.70 12.78 53.92
ZAI 59 62.00 0.89 61.11
ZAM 60 17.70 0.22 17.48
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Grant Equivalent Commitments of Multilateral Aid ( av. 1970-72)
ACTUAL.G2M PROPOSED.G7M DIFFERENCE.G2M
AFG 01 11.70 19.14 -7.44
ALG 02 10.40 2.39 8.01
ARG 03 31.80 4.36 27.44
BOL. 04 16.20 1.98 14.22
BRA 05 105.30 31.87 73.43
BUR 06 3.10 57.07 -53.97
BUI 07 8.90 5.82 3.08
CAM 08 21.30 1.81 19.49
CHI 09 11.10 2.91 8.19
CCL 10 50.50 9.70 40.80
COR 11 8.10 0.27 7.83
CYF‘ 12 3.70 0.04 3.66
DOR 13 12.30 1.25 11.05
ECU 14 20.10 2.51 , 17.59
EGY 15 33.40 17.34 16.06
ELS 16 15.70 1.02 14.68
ETH 17 20.90 36.61 -15.71
GHA 18 7.80 3.06 4.74
GRE 19 7.90 1.25 6.65
GUA 20 2.20 1.61 0.59
GUI 21 3.70 2.90 0.80
HON 22 8.80 0.65 8.15
IND 23 267.50 845.43 -577.93
INA 24 109.90 134.41 -24.51
IRA 25 27.60 6.53 21.07
ISR 26 6.80 0.19 6.61
IVC 27 17.30 0.37 16.93
JAM 28 5.50 0.18 5.32
KEN 29 32.20 4.59 27.61
KOR 30 42.50 12.23 30.27
LIB 31 5.30 0.07 5.23
MAD 32 23.40 4.82 18.58
MAI 33 6.80 1.85 4.95
MAL 34 ' 14.80 1.11 13.69
MEX 35 70.60 13.81 56.79
MOR 36 18.70 5.55 13.15
NIC 37 9.00 0.37 8.63
NIG 38 28.10 41.77 -13.67
PAK 39 17.00 78.86 -61.86
PAN 40 12.30 0.14 12.16
PAR 41 9.60 1.01 8.59
PER 42 20.40 3.74 16.66
PHI 43 19.90 21.98 -2.08
SEN 44 21.30 0.81 20.49
SIL 45 5.00 0.99 4.01
SIN 46 7.40 0.36 7.04
SPA 47 25.10 5.73 19.37
SRI 48 8.80 15.25 -6.45
SUD 49 16.60 15.84 0.76
SYR 50 13.90 1.99 11.91
TAN 51 14.30 6.53 7.77
THA 52 17.80 20.64 -2.84
TOG 53 8.20 0.68 7.52
TRT 54 6.10 0.11 5.99
TUN 55 19.70 1.19 18.51
TUR 56 47.40 13.25 34.15
VEN 57 24.30 1.43 22.87
YUG 58 21.70 4.09 17.61
ZAI 59 29.20 0.29 28.91
ZAM 60 6.90 0.07 6.83
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Grant Equivalent Commitments of Bilateral Aid (av. 1970-72).
ACTUAL.G2B PROPOSED.G2B DIFFERENCE.G2B
AFG 01 39.70 43.49 -3.79
ALG 02 75.40 5.44 69.96
ARG 03 9.50 9.91 -0.41
BOL 04 24.90 4.51 20.39
BRA 05 83.80 72.41 11.39
BUR 06 32.90 129.69 -96.79
BUI 07 11.70 13.24 -1.54
CAM 08 42.10 4.10 38.00
CHI 0? 22.50 6.62 15.88
COL 10 81.50 22.04 59.46
COR 11 9.20 0.62 8.58
CYP 12 4.20 0.09 4.11
DOR 13 19.40 2.85 16.55
ECU 14 24.30 5.69 18.61
EGY 15 32.50 39»41 -6.91
ELS 16 6.30 2.32 3.98
ETH 17 44.50 83.19 -38.69
GHA 18 41.00 6.95 34.05
GRE 19 2.10 2.84 -0.74
GUA 20 17.50 3 • 66 13.84
GUI 21 5.20 6.59 -1.39
HON 22 7.90 1.48 6.42
IND 23 574.40 1921.06 -1346.66
INA 24 468.80 305.42 163.38
IRA 25 9.70 14.83 -5.13
ISR 26 76.10 0.44 75.66
IVC 27 53.50 0.85 52.65
JAM 28 13.60 0.41 13.19
KEN 29 68.80 10.42 58.38
KOR 30 248.80 27.78 221.02
LIB 31 11.10 0.16 10.94
MAD 32 69.80 10.95 58.85
MAI 33 24.50 4.20 20.30
MAL 34 26.50 2.52 23.98
MEX 35 3.60 31.37 -27.77
MOR 36 84,90 12.62 72.28
NIC 37 9.50 0.84 8.66
NIG 38 79.10 94.92 -15.82
PAK 39 185.40 179.20 6.20
PAN 40 17.40 0.33 17.07
PAR 41 10.10 2.30 7.80
PER 42 41.80 8.50 33.30
PHI 43 96.60 49,94 46.66
SEN 44 44.90 1.85 43.05
SIL 45 7.40 2.25 5.15
SIN 46 5.00 0.81 4.19
SPA 47 8.20 13.01 -4.81
SRI 48 32.50 34.65 -2.15
SUD 49 12.00 35.99 -23.99
SYR 50 0.90 4.51 -3.61
TAN 51 63.10 14.84 48.26
THA 52 44.80 46.91 -2.11
TOG 53 12.60 1.55 11.05
TRT 54 1.00 0.25 0.75
TUN 55 83.80 2.71 81.09
TUR 56 119.10 30.12 88.98
VCN 57 7.60 3.25 4.35
YUG 58 18.60 9.29 9.31
ZAI 59 58.50 0.65 57.85
ZAM 60 16.80 0.16 16.64
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Grant Equivalent Commitmen.ts of Total Aid (av. 1970-72).


















































































































































































































































Net Official Flows of Multilateral Aid ( av. 1969-73).
ACTUAL >NOFM PROPOSED.NOFM DIFFERENCE.NORM
AFG 01 8.44 7.88 0.56
ALG 02 14.69 0.98 13.71
ARG 03 1.70 1.79 -0.09
BOL 04 4.94 0.82 4.12
BRA 05 5.27 13.11. -7.85
BUR 06 2.59 23.49 -20.90
BUI 07 6.78 2.40 4.38
CAM 08 17.39 0.74 16.65
CHI 0? 4.39 1.20 3.19
COL 10 10.36 3.99 6.36
COR 11 0.96 0.11 0.84
CYP 12 2.88 0.02 2.87
DOR 13 2.42 0.52 1.91
ECU 14 4.63 1.03 3.60
EGY 15 23.98 7.14 16.84
ELS 16 2.42 0.42 2.00
ETH 17 9.24 15.07 -5.83
GHA 18 7.04 1.26 5.78
GRE 1? 0.80 0.51 0.29
GIJA 20 0.87 0.66 0.21
GUI 21 6.27 1.19 5.08
HON 22 3.24 0.27 2.97
IND 23 144.57 347.94 -203.38
INA 24 32.72 55.32 -22.59
IRA 25 4.12 2.69 1.43
1SR 26 0.05 0.08 -0.03
IVC 27 11.90 0.15 11.75
JAM 28 1.60 0.07 1.53
KEN 29 11.14 1.89 9.25
KOR 30 11.87 5.03 6.84
LIB 31 2.02 0.03 1.99
MAD 32 17.65 1.98 15.67
MAI 33 7.74 0.76 6.98
MAL 34 3.27 0.46 2.81
MEX 35- 9.93 5.68 4.24
MOR 36 3.69 2.29 6.40
NIC 37 1.35 0.15 1.19
NIG 38 13.62 17.19 -3.57
PAK 39 37.22 32.46 4.77
PAN 40 1.62 0.06 1.56
PAR 41 2.81 0.42 2.39
PER 42 4.32 1.54 2.78
PHI 43 5.07 9.05 -3.98
SEN 44 17.71 0.33 17.38
SIL 45 2.34 0.41 1.93
SIN 46 1.89 0.15 1.75
SPA 47 -0.43 2.36 -2,78
SRI 48 6.32 6.28 0.04
SUD 49 12.99 6.52 6.47
SYR 50 10,77 0.82 9.95
TAN 51 10.00 2.69 7.31
THA 52 4.06 8,50 -4.43
TOG 53 8.08 0.28 7.80
TRT 54 0.42 0.05 0.37
TUN 55 12.53 0.49 12.04
TUR 56 19.26 5.45 13.80
VEN 57 1.81 0.59 1.22
YUG 58 -0.35 1,68 -2.03
ZAI 59 21.11 0.12 20.99
ZAM 60 3.47 0.03 3.44
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Net Official Flows of Total Aid (av. 1969-73).
ACTUAL.NOFT PROPOSED.NOFT DIFFERENCE.NOFT
AFG 01 37.52 51.63 -14.11
ALG 02 107.74 6.46 101.29
ARG 03 5.57 11.77 -6.20
BQL 04 30.42 5.35 25.06
BRA 05 103.24 85.97 17.27
BUR 06 35.45 153.97 -118.52
BUI 07 18.84 15.71 3.13
CAM 08 48.03 4.87 43.16
CHI 09 43.89 7.86 36.04
COL 10 103.68 26.16 77.52
COR 11' 12.90 0.74 12.16
CYP 12 5.44 0.11 5.33
DOR 13 25.74 3.38 22.36
ECU 14 19.03 6.76 12.27
EGY 15 36.58 46.79 -10.22
ELS 16 11.92 2.75 9.17
ETH 17 42.31 98.78 -56.47
GHA 18 52.83 8.26 44.58
GRE 19 1.28 3.37 -2.10
GUA 20 13.78 4.35 9.43
GUI 21 13.78 7.82 5.96
HON 22 12.33 1.75 10.58
IND 23 750.26 2280.85 -1530.59
INA 24 439.65 362.62 77.03
IRA 25 9.42 17.61 -8.19
ISR 26 77.49 0.52 76.97
IVC 27 47.59 1.01 46.58
JAM 28 13.32 0.49 12.83
KEN 29 61.14 12.37 48.77
KOR 30 287.70 32.98 254.72
LIB 31 12.00 0.19 11.80
MAD 32 44.76 13.00 31.76
MAI 33 29.36 4.99 24.37
MAL 34 33.74 3.00 30.75
MEX 35 18.48 37.25 -18.77
MOR 36 86.36 14.99 71.37
NIC 37 16.44 1.00 15.44
NIG 38 82.77 112.70 -29.93
PAK 39 320.46 212.76 107.70
PAN 40 15.51 0.39 15.12
PAR 41 13.21 2.73 10.48
PER 42 39.35 10.09 29.26
PHI 43 97.58 59.29 38.29
SEN 44 49.27 2.19 47.07
SIL 45 8.87 2.67 6.20
SIN 46 23.28 0.96 22.32
SPA 47 5.21 15.45 -10.23
SRI 48 47.60 41.14 6.46
SUD 49 17.16 42.73 -25.57
SYR 50 11.81 5.36 6.45
TAN 51 53.31 17.62 35.68
THA 52 58.01 55.70 2.31
TOG 53 18.10 1.84 16.26
TRT 54 3.73 0.30 3.43
TUN 55 104.47 3.22 101.26
TUR 56 158.69 35.76 122.93
VEN 57 6.87" 3.85 3.02
YUG 58 13.97 11.03 2.94
ZAI 59 96.04 0.77 95.27
ZAM 60 20.82 0.19 20.63
APPENDIX 2 
Data Used in the Computations
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LIST OF VARIABLES:
1 : GDP growth rate
2 : Domestic Investment growth r.ate
3 : Foreign Investment growth rate
4 : Exports growth rate
5 : Net Factor Income growth rate
6 : Population growth rate
7 : Domestic Investment share in GDP
8 : Foreign Investment share in GDP
9 : Exports share in GDP
10 : Net Factor Income share in GDP
11 : Imports share in GDP
12 : Physical Quality of Life Index
13 : Per Capita Income
14 : Composite Index of Development
15 : Population
16 : Inflation Rate
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1 2 3 4 5 . 6
AFG 01 3.2 58.5 -33.5 12.0 10.2 2.0
ALG 02 7.0 19.5 41.2 6.5 999.9 3.4
ARG 03 4.5 7.3 -11.8 2.0 4.5 1.5
BOL 04 4.9 6.1 -18.2 5.3 4.9 2.6
BRA 05 9.0 10.3 96.1 11.3 9.0 2.9
BUR 06 3.0 -3.9 -9.2 . -5.8 0.0 2.3
BUI 07 3.5 -17.3 -51.4 7.5 8.5 2.0
CAM 03 6.7 -9.3 63.4 6.6 10.0 2.0
CHI 09 3.3 -0.7 20.5 2.6 -1.9 2.0
COL 10 6.1 3.7 44.1 4.1 10.5 3.2
CGR 11 6.8 11.9 0.4 13.3 1.9 2.9
CYP 12 7.4 2.8 18.2 9.5 4.0 1.2
BOR 13 8.4 20.8 10.3 13.3 18.2 2.6
ECU 1A 6.0 9.8 35.5 7.6 12.9 3.4
EGY 15 3.3 -20.3 26.8 -0.3 3.3 2.5
ELS 16 4.6 6.4 -14.8 5.2 4.6 3.3
ETH 17 4.2 9.6 -42.5 4.2 4.2 2.3
GHA 18 3.4 1.1 -111.9 1.2 3.4 2.6
GRE 19 8.0 10.7 8.7 11.3 12.4 0.5
GUA 20 6.1 10.1 -152.6 7.4 17.0 2.1
GUI 21 3.3 -17.7 16.3 0.0 20.0 2.2
HOI! 22 4.1 7,5 -23.7 4.8 4.1 3.0
INB 23 3.5 2.8 -15.3 4.0 3.5 2.3
INA 24 6.9 18.1 25.0 18.1 6.9 2.2
IRA 25 11.3 14.2 5.6 14.3 14.7 3.2
ISR 26 9.7 6.5 13.3 12.8 9.7 2.8
IVC 27 7.4 11.4 23.6 7.2 7.4 3.3
JAM 28 6.1 -3.6 24.3 5.5 17.5 1.4
KEN 29 7.1 8.0 39.9 3.6 -1.8 3.3
KOR 30 10.9 20.3 4.6 34.4 -89.3 1.9
LIB 31 4.8 20.3 10.2 5.2 -1.6 3.3
MAD 32 2.9 21.6 -5.0 4.0 -3.8 2.5
MAI 33 6.2 40.7 -6.4 8.4 -4.7 2.6
MAL 34 5.8 11.8 27.5 6.2 0.9 2.8
MEX 35 6.5 5.9 17.8 6.9 19.6 3.5'
MOR 36 4.9 3.2 22.8 5.9 -77.9 2.4
NIC 37 4.5 4.7 -12.9 6.9 10.6 3.1
NIG 38 8.7 7.5 19.3 13.2 15.3 2.5
PAK 39 5.4 5.2 -11.0 5.6 205.6 3.3
PAN 40 7.6 12.8 21.3 6.7 7.6 3.1
PAR 41 5.1 7.0 3.8 6.4 16.0 2.6
PER 42 4.6 0.9 -30.4 0.8 -21.7 2.9
PHI 43 5.8 5.5 -122.6 4.1 5.8 3.0
SF.N 44 1.0 0.7 49.3 1.7 -5.6 2.2
SIL 45 2.9 13.6 -30.1 3.0 -6.4 2.2
SIN 46 12.7 24.1 9.8 16.1 22.4 1.8
SPA 47 6.3 8.7 -45.4 14.0 26.2 1.1
SRI 48 4.2 10.3 -35.2 3.1 16.6 2.3
SUD 49 2.1 4.6 -87.6 4.6 -7.8 2.8
SYR 50 6.6 13.5 2.6 9.4 6.6 3.3
TAN 51 5.3 8.8 24.6 4.5 -23.1 2.8
THA 52 7.4 6.1 11.2 7.9 0.0 3.0
TOG 53 5.0 -6.0 27.0 5.7 -1.7 3.4
TRT 54 3.8 9.7 41.6 2.7 -6.1 0.9
TUN 55 7.7 14.4 -15.5 14.4 -5.6 2.1
TUR 56 6.6 10.2 11.3 8.9 27.9 2.5
VEN 57 4.5 5.4 8.0 8.0 -1.6 3.6
YUG 53 6.0 7.0 37.4 8.7 42.7 0.9
ZAI 59 5.8 8.5 1.8 10.0 7.8 2.6
ZAM 60 2.1 -0.3 -2,9 1.7 -6.4 2.9
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7 8 9 10 11
AFG 01 1.3 3.3 11.7 -1.4 15.0
ALG 02 25,2 4.8 23.9 0.1 28.7
ARG 03 19.7 -1.3 8.5 -1.2 7.2
BOL 04 11.8 3.1 23.9 -1.3 27.0
BRA 05 16.2 0.9 8.3 -1.0 9.2
BUR 06 9.6 2,9 7.9 0.0 10.8
BUI 07 0.1 1.0 11.8 -5.7 12.8
CAH 08 11.3 1.4 27.0 • -2.9 28.4
CHI 09 10.5 2.1 10.0 -3.7 12.1
COL 10 17.3 0.9 13.5 -2.2 14.4
COR 11 16.4 7.4 28.0 -2.0 35.4
CYP 12 17.9 7.9 33.0 3.0 45.9
BOR 13 10.3 4.5 18.0 -2.0 22.5
ECU 14 12.0 3.4 17.2 -2.8 20.6
EGY 15 8.4 4.4 14.5 -1.0 18.9
ELS 16 11.6 2.0 26.6 -0.9 28.6
ETH 17 12.3 1.0 11.3 -0.5 12.3
GHA 18 9.1 0.9 20.3 -1.9 21.2
GRE 19 19.2 11.4 11.2 2.3 22.6
GUA 20 10.7 0.5 18.1 -1.8 18.6
GUI 21 6.8 9.8 13.7 -2.6 23.5
HON 22 13.0 1.8 28.4 -2.9 30.2
IND 23 13.9 1.3 4.4 -0.5 5.7
INA 24 9.3 3.6 14.1 -1.8 17.7
IRA 25 16.7 -5.2 22.7 -10.4 17.5
ISR 25 9.2 16.4 25.5 -1.6 41.9
IVC 27 15.9 -2.1 40.4 -6.2 38.3
JAM 28 13.0 4.2 37.4 -7.3 41.6
KEN 29 17.8 1.6 29.0 -2.2 30.6
KOR 30 16.3 8.1 19.3 0.2 27.4
LIB 31 9.4 -14.1 53.4 -20.9 39.3
MAD 32 6.8 5.1 17.8 -2.9 22.9
MAI 33 4.7 11.8 21.2 -1.8 33.0
MAL 34 19.1 -3.9 43.4 -2.0 39.5
MEX 35 17.6 1.0 8.9 -1.5 9.9
NOR 36 11.5 1.9 21.0 -0.6 22.9
NIC 37 12.5 2.4 27.3 -3.2 29.7
NIG 38 15.9 -2.5 21.5 -5.7 19.0
PAK 39 11.7 4.3 9.2 0.1 13.5
PAN 40 20.1 3.0 36.9 -2.6 39.9
PAR 41 12.5 1.8 13.8 -1.8 15.6
PER 42 14.6 -0.7 17.5 -1.5 16.8
PHI 43 19.1 0.3 17.8 -1.1 18.1
SEN 44 11.0 2.8 26.2 -1.5 29.0
SIL 45 10.6 1.6 27.8 -2.1 29.4
SIN 46 27.3 -2.e 20.4 2.1 17.6
SPA 47 21.2 1.6 14.5 -0.5 16.1
SRI 48 13.3 2.3 19.2 -0.8 21.5
sun 4v 11.1 1.1 18.4 -1.0 18.5
SYR 50 13.3 4.0 20.7 1.3 24.7
TAN 51 16.2 3.4 25.1 -0.7 28.5
THA 52 21.4 . 2.6 18.8 0.0 21.4
TOG 53 8,8 4,5 24.6 -2.9 29.1
TRT 54 18.5 0.6 oQ « 3 -6.6 38.9
TUN 55 25.6 5.1 23.1 -2.2 28.2
TUR 56 19,7 2.7 6.6 2.4 9.3
VEN 57 25.0 -8.1 28.6 -7.6 20.5
YUG 58 28.8 3.0 20.3 2,3 23.3
ZAI 59 17.5 1.0 39.8 -4.7 40.8
ZAI1 60 35.9 -13.9 56.8 -4.7 42.9
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12 13 14 15 16
AFG 01 19.0 69.0 12.4 13.9 4.1
ALG 02 42.0 397.0 37.7 13.0 2.6
ARG 03 84.0 1171.0 91.3 22.9 26.6
BOL 04 45.0 169.0 29.6 4.8 6.8
BRA OS 68.0 481.0 54.2 90.4 23«3
BUR 06 51.0 62.0 28.1 27.0 2.9
BUI 07 23.0 60.0 14.0 3.3 3.0
CAM 08 28.0 171.0 21.2 5.8 3.3
CHI 09 77.0 546.0 61.5 9.5 42.6
COL 10 71.0 308.0 48.5 21.0 10.4
COR 11 87.0 492.0 64.2 1.7 2.8
CYP 12 37.0 963,0 84.0 0.6 3.2
DOR 13 64.0 338,0 46.2 3.9 3.4
ECU 14 68.0 271.0 45.4 5.9 6.3
EGY 15 46.0 193.0 31.1 32.5 3.3
ELS 16 67.0 269.0 44.8 3.3 1.6
ETH 17 16.0 68.0 10.9 24.0 1.8
GHA 18 31.0 237.0 25,5 8.3 5.0
GRE 19 91.0 1176.0 95.0 8.8 3.4
GUA 20 53.0 345.0 41.0 4.8 2.0
GUI 21 20.0 84.0 13.5 3.8 3.0
HON 22 50.0 244.0 35.3 2.5 2.3
IND 23 41.0 91.0 24.3 526.8 6.2
INA 24 50.0 89.0 28.7 114.2 58.6
IRA 25 38,0 526.0 41.1 28.4 3.4
ISR 26 90.0 1938.0 126.5 2.8 7.0
IVC 27 28.0 260.0 24.9 4.9 4.1
JAM 28 87.0 667.0 71.6 1.9 6.9
KEN 29 40.0 119.0 25.0 11.0 2.7
KOR 30 80.0 234.0 49.8 30.7 11.1
LIB 31 26.0 212.0 21.9 1.3 4.7
MAD 32 44.0 118.0 27.0 6.9 3.4
MAI 33 29.0 74.0 17.6 4.4 5.7
MAL 34 59.0 394.0 46.1 10.6 2.5
HEX 35 75.0 638.0. 64.3 49.1 4.6
MOR 36 40.0 229.0 29.6 14.9 1.9
NIC 37 53.0 407.0 43.6 2.0 2.7
NIG 38 25.0 134.0 18.1 64.7 7.0
PAK 39 37.0 87.0 22.2 60.7 5.5
PAN 40 81.0 638.0 67.3 1.4 2.6
PAR 41 74.0 297.0 49.5 2.2 3.3
PER 42 58.0 461.0 48.4 13.0 8.9
PHI 43 73.0 201.0 45.0 35.8 8.8
SEN 44 22.0 235.0 20.9 3.8 2.5
SIL 45 29.0 124.0 19.7 2.6 3.2
SIN 46 85.0 1001.0 84.6 2.0 3.1
SPA 47 94.0 1117.0 94.0 33.3 6.2
SRI 48 83.0 89.0 45.2 12.3 5.1
SUD 49 33.0 88.0 20.2 15.3 3.7
SYR 50 52.0 272.0 37.4 6.1 4.1
TAN 51 28.0 95.0 18.0 12.6 4.7
THA 52 70.0 183.0 42.7 35.1 4.2
TOG 53 28.0 135.0 19.7 1.9 3.7
TRT 54 88.0 711.0 73.9 1.0 5.1
TUN 55 44.0 300.0 34.6 5.0 3.2
TUR 56 54,0 407.0 44.1 34.4 10.6
VEN 57 80,0 1195.0 90.3 10.0 2.2
YUG 58 85.0 666.0 70.5 20.2 11.5
ZAI 59 28.0 99.0 18.2 17.7 28.3
ZAM 60 29.0 330.0 27.9 4.1 5.6
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